

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
24 April 2008

Original: English

Letter dated 24 April 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1766 (2007), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia (see enclosure).

The Committee would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Dumisani Shadrack **Kumalo**
Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia



Enclosure

**Letter dated 2 April 2008 from the members of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia addressed to the Chairman
of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 751 (1992)**

We have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1766 (2007).

(Signed) Bruno **Schiemsky**
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia
(Signed) Gilbert Charles **Barthe**
(Signed) Charles **Lengalenga**
(Signed) Juliana **Ruhfus**

Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1766 (2007)

Contents

	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Page</i>
Abbreviations		5
Summary		6
I. Introduction	1–26	8
A. Mandate	1–4	8
B. Methodology	5–8	9
C. Description of the security-related environment	9–26	9
II. Arms embargo violations	27–160	13
A. Introduction	27–32	13
B. Cross-border arms movements and means of transport	33–76	13
C. Role of States	77–102	20
D. Weapons and ammunition tracing	103–107	24
E. Somali Arms Markets: fragmentation, transnational links and business opportunities	108–150	25
F. Re-exportation to Kenya	151–156	32
G. Training by nationals of other States	157–160	33
III. Somali Police Force	161–186	34
A. Introduction	161–162	34
B. Leadership of the Somali Police Force	163–164	34
C. Auxiliary forces	165–171	35
D. Somali Police Force in combat operations	172–174	36
E. Somali Police Force and arms	175–178	37
F. Problems with Somali Police Force funding	179–186	38
IV. Finance	187–212	39
A. General	187–188	39
B. Specific allegations	189–203	39
C. Bilateral contributions to the Transitional Federal Government	204–209	42
D. Somali businessmen	210–212	43
V. Capacity-building	213–216	44
VI. Cooperation with States and organizations	217–237	44
A. Due process	217–222	44

B. States	223–233	45
C. Organizations	234–237	47
VII. Observations, conclusions and recommendations	238–257	48
A. Observations	238–247	48
B. Conclusions	248–253	50
C. Recommendations	254–257	51
Annexes		
I. Response of the Government of Eritrea to the Monitoring Group		54
II. Ethiopian military flights into Somalia		56
III. Response of the Government of the United Kingdom to the Monitoring Group		57
IV. Response of the Government of the Russian Federation to the Monitoring Group		59
V. Arms purchases and sales at the Somali Arms Markets investigated during the mandate period ..		60
VI. Letter dated 27 July 2007 from President Yusuf to the Minister of Finance		72
VII. Letter dated 8 August 2007 from President Yusuf to the Minister of Finance		74
VIII. Letter dated 19 August 2007 from President Yusuf to the Minister of Finance		76
IX. Overview of prices of weapons and ammunition at the Somali Arms Markets		78
X. Transitional Federal Government accounting for donations from Saudi Arabia		79
XI. Countries visited and representatives of Governments, organizations and private entities interviewed		82

Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
Bakaraaha Arms Market	Bakaraaha Arms Market
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Force
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICU	Islamist Courts Union
IMO	International Maritime Organization
MV	Merchant Vessel
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade
SAM	Somali Arms Market
SNA	Somali National Army
So. Sh	Somali shilling
SPF	Somali Police Force
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces
WFP	World Food Programme

Summary

It is the task of the Monitoring Group to collect and report information regarding arms embargo violations and related matters in the context of unfolding events in Somalia. To this end, the Monitoring Group has highlighted its findings for the current mandate period, noting the major factors and developments in the present summary and describing them more fully in the body of the report.

The Monitoring Group has observed during this mandate, from October 2007 to April 2008, continued militarization and an increase of armed actions between opposition groups and the Transitional Federal Government force. Opposition groups, particularly the Shabaab, have gained control of more territory and limited the deployment of Transitional Federal Government troops and their backers, the Ethiopian National Defence Force. Insurgents carry out sustained attacks on the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian troops using guerrilla warfare, and the latter are losing ground. Insurgent groups have established bases across Somalia and use a number of locations to receive regular shipments of arms by sea. Their increased “military” strength and successes have contributed to the fragmentation of the Transitional Federal Government security forces, which commanders have started to reinforce with their own militias, within or outside the structure of the Government security sector.

During the present mandate period, the Monitoring Group has noted that weapons sent to all parties of the Somali conflict originate in some of the same States as previously reported, namely Eritrea, Yemen and Ethiopia. The routes are, however, more covert, and weapons reach Somalia either by a larger number of smaller vessels, or through remote locations along land borders. The present report highlights that Somaliland also plays a significant role as an entry point for weapons, as does the coast of Puntland and central and south Somalia. The conflict is being increasingly exported to sea, as coastal towns that are used for the illegal import of weapons also provide bases for heavily armed pirates who have carried out an unprecedented number of hijackings.

The Monitoring Group has found that the arms embargo has limited impact on the conflict, as the parties are still able to receive arms. The Transitional Federal Government is not in a position to control its borders against arms arriving in violation of the embargo. Cross-border arms shipments in violation of the arms embargo either reach the different parties to the conflict directly, or fuel the seven different arms markets that have opened recently since the previously well-documented Bakaraaha Arms Market moved underground.

The fact that members of the Transitional Federal Government are buying arms at the market in Mogadishu is not new to the Monitoring Group, but during this mandate period the Monitoring Group received information on sales of arms by prominent officials of the security sectors of the Government, Ethiopian officers and Ugandan officers of the African Union Mission in Somalia. Arms on sale originate from army stocks or are seized following battles with insurgents. According to arms traders, the biggest suppliers of ammunition to the markets are Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government commanders, who divert boxes officially declared “used during combat”. The Mogadishu arms markets are doing a booming business,

and, according to precise information received by the Monitoring Group, their clients include parties in Kenya.

The Somali Police Force no longer differs from other actors in the armed conflict, despite the fact that many of its members have received training in accordance with international standards. There is a certain confusion in the streets about who is part of the Somali Police Force, as it operates jointly with the militia of Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Dheere” and the Somali National Army. Former militia leaders have also been integrated into the Somali Police Force command, along with some of their men. The Somali Police Force has purchased arms in Yemen, in violation of the arms embargo, not having requested an exemption from the Committee. Police commanders are also acting as buyers and sellers of arms at the Mogadishu arms markets.

The Transitional Federal Government budget, heavily supported by international donors, lacks minimum standards of transparency. Some donors expressed discontent that some of the funding provided, despite being earmarked for civilian and peacebuilding activities, may have been used for military activities and the purchase of military materiel.

Pervasive lawlessness and lack of oversight create an environment in which the monitoring of potential embargo violations, including those alleged to have been committed by Transitional Federal Government officials, is severely hampered. These obstacles are further exacerbated by inadequate cooperation by the Transitional Federal Government in regard to the Monitoring Group’s request for information.

The Monitoring Group has identified a number of recommendations, and, in order to strengthen the efficiency of the arms embargo, would recommend that the Security Council consider the imposition of additional individual sanctions on travel and the assets of key individuals, the posting of international technical assistance advisers in key locations outside and inside Somalia, and the provision of added means to States requesting such capacity-building support.

I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 1766 (2007) of 23 July 2007, the Security Council conferred the following mandate on the Monitoring Group on Somalia:

(a) To continue the tasks outlined in paragraphs 3 (a) to (c) of resolution 1587 (2005);

(b) To continue to investigate, in coordination with relevant international agencies, all activities, including in the financial, maritime and other sectors, which generate revenues used to commit arms embargo violations;

(c) To continue to investigate any means of transport, routes, seaports, airports and other facilities used in connection with arms embargo violations;

(d) To continue refining and updating information on the draft list of those individuals and entities that violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733 (1992), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for possible future measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee as and when the Committee deems appropriate;

(e) To continue making recommendations based on its investigations, on the previous reports of the Panel of Experts (S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) appointed pursuant to resolutions 1425 (2002) of 22 July 2002 and 1474 (2003) of 8 April 2003, and on the previous reports of the Monitoring Group (S/2004/604, S/2005/153, S/2005/625, S/2006/229, S/2006/913 and S/2007/436) appointed pursuant to resolutions 1519 (2003) of 16 December 2003, 1558 (2004) of 17 August 2004, 1587 (2005) of 15 March 2005, 1630 (2005) of 14 October 2005, 1676 (2006) of 10 May 2006 and 1724 (2006) of 29 November 2006;

(f) To work closely with the Committee on specific recommendations for additional measures to improve overall compliance with the arms embargo;

(g) To assist in identifying areas where the capacities of States in the region can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo;

(h) To provide to the Security Council, through the Committee, a midterm briefing within 90 days from its establishment, and to submit progress reports to the Committee on a monthly basis;

(i) To submit for the Security Council's consideration, through the Committee, a final report covering all the tasks set out above, no later than 15 days prior to the termination of the mandate of the Monitoring Group.

2. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi, and comprised the following experts: Bruno Schiemsy (Belgium), arms expert and Coordinator; Gilbert Charles Barthe (Switzerland), customs expert; Charles Lengalenga (Zambia), finance expert; and Juliana Ruhfus (Germany), arms and transport expert. The Monitoring Group was assisted by a finance consultant: Rico Carisch.

3. The Monitoring Group travelled to Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Somalia, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Yemen.

4. Pursuant to paragraph 3 (h) of resolution 1766 (2007), the Monitoring Group kept the Security Council and its Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia informed, throughout the period of its mandate, of its activities by submitting monthly progress reports through the United Nations Secretariat and by providing a midterm briefing to the Committee on 15 January 2008.

B. Methodology

5. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the first and second reports of the Monitoring Group apply to work conducted during the current mandate. The Monitoring Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous reports (S/2004/604 and S/2007/436). The methodology used for the current report is as follows:

(a) Collection of information on events and topics from multiple sources, where possible;

(b) Collection of information from sources with first-hand or quasi first-hand knowledge of events;

(c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;

(d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the relevant expert of the Group and the collective assessment of the Group;

(e) Continuously seeking out documentary support for the information collected.

6. The Monitoring Group also relied on the concept of the source circle, that is, the deliberate and systematic effort to gain access to those involved in arms embargo violations by way of individuals who have direct knowledge or know people who have direct knowledge of details of violations.

7. The Monitoring Group interviewed government officials in the region and, where relevant, representatives from diplomatic missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. It also contacted numerous key members of Somali civil society.

8. The practice of due process, in the Group's interaction with States, organizations and individuals, as described in section VI of the present report, is also relevant to the Group's methodology.

C. Description of the security-related environment

9. At its midterm briefing dated 15 January 2008 and in its second monthly report covering the period 15 January to 15 February 2008, the Monitoring Group informed the Committee of the continued militarization and expansion of the conflict in Somalia. Since then, militarization and expansion of the conflict have increased.

10. Militarization by the principal actors involves the receipt of arms shipments, military training activities, the receipt of military materiel or logistics and overall efforts to establish command and control capabilities combined with military-style

organizations and structures. For example, since April 2007, the Shabaab has reopened many of its training camps and programmes. Nationals of other States are providing the bulk of training, such as the use of explosives, guerrilla-style tactics and assassinations (see sect. II.G below). Regarding the Transitional Federal Government, the Monitoring Group has found that the Somali Police Force is now being used in military combat operations (see sect. III.D).

11. Since the start of its mandate in October 2007, the Monitoring Group has witnessed a dramatic expansion of the conflict. Regions of Somalia that once enjoyed relative stability are increasingly engulfed in the conflict, and insurgents, such as the Shabaab, Islamist Courts Union (ICU) combatants, and Muqawama (Resistance), have systematically increased their control over the territory of Somalia. El Bur and Buulo Burto in the Hiiraan region and Guriel in the Galgaduud region are now under insurgent control. Insurgents are also strengthening their presence in other locations such as Dinsoor and Buur Hakaba in the Bay region by sending their own militias to the location or by providing support in the form of weapons and ammunition to local militias. Furthermore, the situation in Puntland is increasingly unstable. The Monitoring Group received information that insurgents have sent militias, weapons and foreign fighters (see sect. II.C) to Puntland to destabilize the local government. Also, the Shabaab has set up training facilities in the mountains of Bargal, Puntland. Finally, the Monitoring Group foresees the likelihood of more armed confrontations in the Jowhar, Beletweyne and Baidoa areas, and on the road between Afgooye and Baidoa.

Transitional Federal Government

12. The period of this mandate saw further fracturing and disintegration of Government control over military and security forces and the concentration of clan-based control over individual forces through allegiances with respective commanders.

13. The Somali National Security Agency, under General Mohamed Warsame Darwish, remains most closely allied with President Abdullahi Yusuf. Principally an intelligence agency, it also operates as an anti-insurgent force, is well armed and often actively engaged in combat.

14. The Somali National Army, under General Salah Hassan Jama "Liif" has suffered a particularly high number of desertions often involving soldiers selling their weapons to finance their return home. The Somali National Army also experienced the highest number of casualties in recent months. Both these factors make the current size of the force nearly impossible to ascertain. As with the National Security Agency, the military remains associated with President Yusuf and is often accused of being disproportionately staffed with soldiers from the north of the country.

15. As a result, both forces are accused by Hawiye leaders in south and central Somalia of targeting the Hawiye community, rather than securing peace, reinforcing the idea of a historical struggle between the Hawiye and the northern Darod clans over the leadership of the country.

16. The Somali Police Force is also actively involved in combat and battles with insurgent forces. The Somali Police Force, since May 2007 under the control of former warlord and Police Commissioner General Abdi Qeybdiid, currently

comprises 7,000 active officers, approximately half of whom have received training. At the very least, the forces most closely under Qeybdiid's command, and in particular Qeybdiid's paramilitary Birmadka force based in southern Mogadishu, are heavily armed.

17. As Governor of the Banadir region and Mayor of Mogadishu, warlord Mohamed Dheere sustains his own heavily armed militia comprising several hundred gunmen. Since Somali law gives the Mayor the right to command officers of the Somali Police Force, it is often difficult to differentiate between the police and militia under the control of Mohamed Dheere. Dheere's forces, which are concentrated north of the capital and in the Middle Shabelle region, are least accountable to the Government.

18. Particularly since the end of 2007, Transitional Federal Government military and security forces have come under increasing pressure from insurgents. Heavy fighting and targeted attacks on individuals, together with the failure to adequately pay the forces, resulted in a sizeable number of desertions. Commanders reacted by relying on old loyalties and recruited their clan members as replacements. That, in turn, led to a vicious cycle of further desertions. The increasing militarization is also reflected in increased sales and purchases at the Somali Arms Market.

19. The Transitional Federal Government military, intelligence and police forces can no longer be seen as pursuing the same goals. During the mandate of the Monitoring Group, they have increasingly operated as virtually independent fighting forces, and, according to United Nations and Somali media reports, have even been pitted in battle against one another.

20. The cumulative effect of this has made the idea of nationally representative Transitional Federal Government forces acting on behalf of the entire Somali population hard to sustain. Individual commanders are assembling forces driven by self-interest, possibly anticipating the demise of the Transitional Federal Government and their future role in a post-Transitional Federal Government environment.

Armed opposition

21. Armed opposition to the Transitional Federal Government and the presence of the Ethiopian National Defence Force in Somalia consists of at least three different groups, the Shabaab (The Youth), Muqawama and ICU. These three groups are united by sharing an enemy, the Transitional Federal Government, and their demand for the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops. They also share fighters, organize joint combat operations and share weapons, but they differ with regard to strength and ultimate objective. The Muqawama and ICU combatants have a predominantly domestic nationalistic agenda and receive fairly broad support from the population.

22. According to members of the Shabaab, the group pursues an international agenda and wishes to extend its presence and control beyond the territory of Somalia into the Ogaden region, Yemen and eventually Saudi Arabia. The Shabaab has a command and control structure, operates many training camps and programmes inside and outside Somalia, and receives support from States in the form of arms and training (see sect. II.C) and from large numbers of experienced jihadist fighters from various continents who share insurgency expertise with the Shabaab (see sect. II.G). As a result of this foreign support, the Monitoring Group

observed during the current mandate period the military successes of the Shabaab from information provided by first-hand sources, the United Nations and media reports.

23. In December 2007, the Shabaab appointed a new supreme commander, Abu Zubeyr. The Shabaab have their strongest presence in the Galgaduud region in central Somalia, under the control of Adan Hashi "Ayrow". The south falls under the command of Sheikh Hassan Turki, while operations in the Hiraan and Bakool regions are led by Mukhtar Robow Abu-Mansour. The Shabaab is increasingly expanding its control over the territory of Somalia. The Ethiopian military, faced with an increasing number of casualties, sent reinforcements to Somalia, regrouped its forces, and abandoned smaller bases.

North-western Somalia

24. Somaliland, or north-western Somalia, the most stable region of Somalia, in 1993 characterized itself as autonomous, and is not involved in the conflict in southern Somalia, which is characterized by fighting over clan and religious allegiance.

25. Somaliland has been, however, in conflict with neighbouring Puntland over control of the territories of eastern Sool and Sanaag. A pro-Somaliland faction of the Dhulbahante clan, under the influence of the previously dismissed Puntland Minister of the Interior, took control of the town of Laas Anood from the pro-Puntland faction and called in the Somaliland army for reinforcement. Exchanges of fire between Puntland and Somaliland troops in the area surrounding Laas Anood started in September 2007. United Nations sources reported that by 1 October, Somaliland troops had taken full control of the town. Another significant battle took place on 15 October, when Somaliland troops repelled a Puntland attack and reinforced a frontline defence position 35 km east of the town. Despite numerous rumours of the rearming and regrouping of troops by Puntland, this was the last confrontation for the control of eastern Sool and Sanaag. The consolidation of such control by Somaliland required the recruitment of local clan militia members and new civilian authorities, financed by a tax increase.

Puntland

26. The general security situation in Puntland has steadily degenerated since the beginning of the current mandate. Puntland suffered defeat at the hands of Somaliland, and had to cede the territories of eastern Sool and Sanaag in October 2007. There has been an increase in crime, kidnapping and insurgency-related killings, especially in Bossaso. Kidnappings of foreigners by armed clan militiamen for ransom have become a lucrative business. There is growing political tension between the Puntland State Government and the Transitional Federal Government over the control of natural resources, and the allocation of tax revenues.

II. Arms embargo violations

A. Introduction

27. The Monitoring Group has found that during the current mandate period a number of States continue to be in violation of the embargo, while some trans-shipment routes have changed. Eritrea is now supplying weapons along the borders of Djibouti (see also the Eritrea Government response in annex I to the present report). During the mandate period, the Monitoring Group specifically investigated a number of supplying countries, the routes used, and the ports along the Somali coast used for the entry of weapons.

28. The Somali Arms Market showed some significant changes during the mandate of the Monitoring Group. The Bakaraaha Arms Market as described in previous reports no longer exists. Instead, no fewer than seven individual arms markets have emerged that operate less visibly and more along the lines of known contacts and personal introductions.

29. The second major change has been the emergence of non-Somali participants at the Market, in clear violation of the embargo. Both Ethiopian troops and members of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), represented through local interlocutors, have entered the Somali Arms Market as sellers of weapons and ammunition.

30. The third change is a noticeably more active presence of former warlords who are now at the helm of Transitional Federal Government security forces and act as buyers and sellers at the Somali Arms Market. Commanders and officers from the National Security Agency, the Somali Police Force and the Somali National Army sell weapons obtained by security forces from arms caches, during the disarmament process, from army stocks and soldiers killed in combat.

31. The Shabaab continues to operate within the Somali Arms Market, not only buying weapons and ammunition for its combat operations, but also using the Somali Arms Market as a revenue generator by selling arms from their caches or from Transitional Federal Government stockpiles taken during combat to the market. Warlords have again begun to buy arms at the Somali Arms Market in preparation for the perceived collapse of the Transitional Federal Government in the near future.

32. Within the context of the prevailing insecurity in Somalia and the wider region, the Somali Arms Market also plays an important role by being the source for arms shipments to Kenya (see sect. II.F).

B. Cross-border arms movements and means of transport

Introduction

33. During the current mandate, the Monitoring Group received significant information on arms deliveries to Somalia through its seaports. Shipments originating in Yemen typically land at Somali ports located along the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Vessels embarking from the United Arab Emirates have been reported to load embargoed items at sea. Other consignments have been shipped from other regional States, in particular from Yemen. Deliveries

from the East African coast usually arrive along ports in southern Somalia, such as Kismayo.

34. The increased international naval presence has a limited deterrent effect, particularly along the Horn of Africa. The main difficulties are the number of sanctions violators who are operating at sea and the practical difficulties of intercepting and controlling suspect cargoes in international waters.

35. During the current mandate, the Monitoring Group received information with regard to new routes being used by violators of the embargo. For example, weapons flow in from Eritrea by a route along the Eritrean-Djiboutian border via Zone 5 (Ogaden), from Ethiopia into Somalia (see sect. II.C).

36. Also noticeable during the current mandate was the use of “low tech” means of transport to bring arms into Somalia. Donkey carts, camels and horses have often been used as means of transport, for example, on the Eritrea-Djibouti border, and inland from Kismayo. As a result, tracing arms shipments has become more difficult.

Importation through Somaliland

Government efforts on weapons control

37. Somaliland, despite being a traditionally armed society, has banned the carrying of weapons in public, and is in the process of regulating the private ownership and trade of firearms, with a firearm bill under consideration by the Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee. In October 2005, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Somaliland Ministry of the Interior started a programme to register and license private weapons, and in December 2007, a total of 7,114 firearms were registered.

38. According to Somaliland authorities, Somaliland does not move arms through or send arms to southern Somalia, although small-scale weapons smuggling occurs, owing to a lack of capacity for monitoring the coastline facing Yemen. While mentioning that they had arrested a number of arms smugglers and seized their cargo, the authorities did not provide any specifics. They also stated that the arms trade in general, including the issue of the arms embargo on Somalia, was of lesser priority in terms of Somaliland security compared to a potential counter-attack by Puntland over eastern Sool and Sanaag, the issue of illegal migration and penetration by Islamist militants. The Government did not provide information on any cross-border arms consignments seized to date, but was more successful inland. A significant seizure was made in Hargeisa in August 2007, where a quantity of AK-47s, PKMs and RPGs sufficient to fill the flatbed of a pickup truck was found in a house belonging to Ogadeni Ethiopians. Hargeisa and Burao are known to have an active underground weapons market, supplied through Yemeni channels.

Arms flows

39. Arms carried by Yemeni dhows arrive regularly to the Somaliland coast. In the absence of Somaliland administration in such places, Yemeni fishermen and dhow operators have established strong business relations with the elders of the Issaq and Warsangeli clans in control of the coastal areas around the ports of Heis, Maidh and Las Qoray. Weapons trading from Yemeni dhows through remote natural ports are a part of the wider general trade (fuel, plasticware, cement, food) aimed at avoiding

customs duties. Usually, several weapons traders arrange for their respective consignments to be transported on the same dhow, sharing transport costs, and awaiting their lot at the port.

40. As an example, the Monitoring Group received information that on 9 January 2008, a fishing boat from Yemen docked at a small port under the control of a Warsangeli clan militia, between Las Qoray and Maidh, in East Sanaag, with 1.5 tons of AK-47s and pistols on board. The consignment, offloaded onto pickup trucks, was arranged by Somaliland arms traders. A local businessman explained to the Monitoring Group that Yemeni dhows deliver arms, and fuel, to local clans as payment for fishing rights. The Warsangeli clans, in control of Las Qoray port, are major supporters of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), supplying them with weapons and using routes along the Puntland border, through Boocame, in territories ruled by the Dhulbahante clan, with whom they have good relations.

41. The Monitoring Group received information that the Shabaab is in the process of infiltrating the Somaliland Armed Forces, that it has a support network in the Burao region for the care of wounded fighters, and that Shabaab sympathizers in Somaliland are in contact with their counterparts in the south.

42. The Monitoring Group has also learned that Somaliland has developed a close relationship with Ethiopia on transport and security matters. The Berbera corridor, inaugurated in the presence of an Ethiopian delegation in mid-November 2005, allows for the use of the Berbera Port for transiting cargo by road to Ethiopia. Ethiopia has provided support to Somaliland on military and intelligence matters, reciprocated by actions against ONLF elements based in Somaliland, including the handing over of such elements to the Ethiopian Army. The Monitoring Group has received information that the Somaliland Armed Forces received weapons and military equipment from Ethiopia, and that several Somaliland army officers have undergone combat training in Ethiopia, delivered by instructors from the Ethiopian National Defence Force and the United States Army. The Monitoring Group expects to receive information from the Ethiopian and United States Governments on this allegation (see sect. II.G).

43. Both the supply of arms and training are delivered in violation of Security Council resolution 733 (1992) as extended by resolution 1425 (2002) to include "training related to military activities" (see sect. II.F).

44. The Monitoring Group has also received information that the Somaliland National Security Agency receives support in intelligence and security matters from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In this framework, the United Kingdom operates flights with military planes, landing at the Berbera airport instead of at the Hargeisa airport, without prior notification to the Committee (see sect. II.C and annex III).

45. Information received by the Monitoring Group indicates that a significant amount of weapons imported to Somaliland, for example from Yemen, are destined for southern Somalia or ONLF in Ethiopia Zone 5. In 2006 and 2007, the importance of Somaliland as a trans-shipment point for arms sales at the Bakaraaha Arms Market was already highlighted in the reports of the Monitoring Group dated 5 April 2006 and 27 June 2007, respectively (S/2006/229, S/2007/436). The Monitoring Group has received information that Mogadishu-based arms traders fly

regularly from K50, Galkayo airports to Hargeisa, and travel to Yemen by boat to order weapons consignments.

46. While private traders take the risk of importing regular consignments of arms from Yemeni dhows off-loading along the Somaliland coast, the Somaliland Government, for more important purchases, avoids a potential interception in the Gulf of Aden by the United States naval task force by buying arms in Mogadishu at the Somali Arms Markets.

47. The Monitoring Group has received information that Mogadishu-based arms traders sold 10 shipments of arms for Somaliland and Puntland between October and November 2007. The delivery routes carefully avoid Ethiopian controls in Baidoa and Beletweyne.

Importation through Puntland and Bossaso

48. The Monitoring Group also ascertained that a large number of arms imports arrived at their final destination in southern and central Somalia from the Puntland coast and the port of Bossaso. Many arms traders active in Bossaso belong to the Warsangeli sub-clan of the Darods and originate in East Sanaag. They are known as suppliers across Somalia of clans, warlords, the Somali Arms Market and ONLF. Police Commissioner Qeybdiid has stated that shipments to the Mogadishu business community frequently enter Somalia through the Bossaso Port. He promised to provide evidence, which so far has not been forthcoming (see sect. VI.B).

49. The Port of Bossaso is used by numerous businessmen involved in the arms trade for profit reasons, independent of any allegiance. Private trans-shipments are stopped by the Puntland authorities, such as on 10 October 2007, when the Puntland Police impounded a truck with 148 pieces of explosives at the Armo checkpoint, 90 km south of Bossaso, heading to Mogadishu from the mountains near Bossaso. On 29 January 2008, a businessman was arrested at a police checkpoint between Bossaso and Garowe with a shipment of arms intended for Galkayo.

50. It has been reported to the Monitoring Group that on or about 8 January 2008, a group of unidentified businessmen received a consignment of arms from Yemen that entered Somalia through the port of Bossaso. The shipment continued through Ceel Dheer and landed by dhow at El Ma'an port, with the final destination of the Somali Arms Market in Mogadishu. The shipment consisted of 180 AK-47s, 45 PKMs, 27 RPG-2/7s, 3 dhuunshilke, 11 zu-badeed, 16 SR-88 assault rifles, 9 M-16 rifles, 38 pistols, 200 hand grenades, 109 M-72 LAW anti-tank weapons, 9 mortars, 60 pieces of night vision equipment, and 48 boxes of a variety of ammunition.

51. Historically Bossaso has been a base for militant Islamist groups such as al-Ittihad and ICU. Strong linkages prevail with the Shabaab fighting in the southern regions of South Mudug and Galgaduud. Before October 2007, arms from Bossaso destined for Galkayo were transiting by Laas Anood. Control of the town by the Somaliland army has since curtailed this direct supply route.

Importations through the Galgaduud and Mudug regions for the insurgency

52. The Monitoring Group has received information that the ports of Harardheere and Hobyo in the Mudug region and Ceel Dheer in the Galgaduud region are central supply hubs for nearby Shabaab bases in Dhusamareeb and El Bur and in Mogadishu. All three natural ports are minimally protected by Transitional Federal

Government forces. The following shipments were reported to have arrived at these locations:

Ceel Dheer

53. On or about 28 March 2007, according to a high-ranking Transitional Federal Government security official, a shipment arrived consisting of 10 PKMs, 200 AK-47s, some B10s and 30 boxes of ammunition for the AK-47s and PKMs, organized by Abgal businessmen in support of insurgent forces. The shipment was confiscated by Mogadishu Mayor and Banadir region Governor Mohamed Dheere, who received advance notice of the shipment, and waited until it was transferred to cars and camouflaged with rice and other foodstuffs before attacking and capturing the convoy.

54. At the end of May 2007, according to the same Transitional Federal Government security official, Mohamed Dheere detained in Jowhar a truck originating from Ceel Dheer, loaded with 40,000 rounds of AK-47 and PKM ammunition, and packaged in approximately 13 boxes. On or about 23 July 2007, two dhows allegedly from Eritrea arrived with arms for the Shabaab camps at Dhusamareeb, and on 28 January 2008, insurgents arrived aboard speedboats.

Hobyo

55. On approximately 18 October 2007, a dhow with a shipment of AK-47s, ammunition, PKMs, and RPG-2s arrived at El Adde in Mogadishu. The weapons delivery, which had been organized in Yemen by a businessman from Hobyo, was transferred in Hobyo to two smaller dhows that then transited via Ceel Dheer to Mogadishu. Shabaab combatants used these weapons to fight the Transitional Federal Government forces at the Holwadag police station.

56. In April 2007, a dhow, allegedly from Eritrea, landed with a number of PKMs, AK-47s, and ammunition. The arms were then trans-shipped by road to the Shabaab located in Dhusamareeb.

Harardheere

57. On or about 28 July 2007, two dhows arrived, allegedly from Yemen and Eritrea, carrying weapons that were transported onwards to insurgents based in El Bur. In June 2007, insurgents arrived on two speedboats.

Southern Somalia

58. Besides Kismayo, Badmadow and Barawe are additional recipient or stopover ports, used for deliveries en route from East Africa destined for insurgent groups in Somalia. The extreme south of Somalia appears also to be a point of origin for weapons consignments going to ONLF and Oromo Liberation Front fighters in Zone 5, in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

Mogadishu International Seaport

59. The Monitoring Group continues to receive information concerning weapons shipments into the Mogadishu International Seaport, which take place despite the presence of Transitional Federal Government customs, security and police units.

60. On 20 September 2007, a vessel that began its journey in the United Arab Emirates, and onto which arms were transferred off the coast of Yemen, arrived at Mogadishu Port. The traffickers had hidden ammunition in drums of milk powder tins, and a number of AK-47s and RPG-2/7s in water tanks and 20-litre oil tanks. While some facts are still unknown, the Monitoring Group has established that the delivery was intercepted by Transitional Federal Government police forces off the port. Members of port security allegedly attempted to sell the intercepted arms back to the businessmen who had organized the shipment. In order to ascertain whether these attempts were successful and to establish the current whereabouts of the arms, the Monitoring Group repeatedly contacted Port Manager Abdi Jino by phone and e-mail and through intermediaries, and did not receive an answer (see sect. VI.A). In addition, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the United Arab Emirates on 30 November 2007, requesting further information about the vessel in question, but no reply was received by the submission date of this report.

61. On approximately 18 October 2007, another vessel arrived at Mogadishu Port, onto which embargoed items had also been transferred off the coast of Yemen. While there was no arms discovery at that time, the Monitoring Group has learned that the weapons have reached their destination. Documentation about shipments, companies involved and crews have been compiled, and the Monitoring Group continues its investigation. The Monitoring Group has also met with Yemeni Government representatives who have denied the allegations.

Integrating investigations of arms smuggling and piracy

62. Three key ports have been identified where significant overlap exists between arms smuggling activities and piracy cases. Out of the 11 hijackings reported by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2007, half were pirated from within the wider Mogadishu Port region. Six of the hijacked vessels were released from Hobyo and Harardheere, the natural ports used by arms embargo violators for weapons shipments, which provided the hijackers with a “safe haven” for pirated ships out of reach of the authorities.

63. Ten of the 11 hijacking cases reported by IMO resulted in ransom payments of a combined total exceeding \$3 million. Even after making deductions for middlemen abroad and in Somalia, this represents a substantial amount of money and increased buying power reaching the communities of Hobyo and Harardheere.

Ports of the Galgaduud and Mudug regions

64. Harardheere is considered a Suleiman clan stronghold and former base for one of the most infamous pirates, Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne”. “Afweyne” has publicly admitted his role in hijackings, for example, by giving interviews to Agence France-Presse on 23 August 2006. According to international investigators, he led the group of pirates that hijacked the MV *Rozen* on 25 February 2007. He was allegedly also involved with more recent ransom negotiations. The Monitoring Group has received credible information from Transitional Federal Government security sources indicating “Afweyne” as a past weapons importer from Eritrea for former warlord Hussein Aideed, acting as joint contractor with Aideed’s wife, Fatun Hussein.

65. Another leader of the Harardheere-based pirate groups is the warlord Garaad Mohamud Mohamed. According to information received by the Monitoring Group

from the Republic of Korea, he was responsible for the hijacking of the South Korean-flagged fishing vessels *Mavuno I* and *Mavuno II* (see sect. VI.A).

66. The vessels were released from Harardheere after ransom payments were made on 11 November 2007. Garaad Mohamud Mohamed had publicly admitted his role in an interview with Shabelle Radio. According to press reports, in January 2006, Garaad openly threatened to kill hostages after some of his accomplices were caught by the United States Navy.

67. Other recent piracy cases involving Harardheere were the hijacking of the *Al Aqueed*, a dhow from the United Arab Emirates, and the fishing vessel *Ching Fong Hwa 168* from Taiwan Province of China. The latter was held in and released from the port of Harardheere after a ransom payment was made in November 2007.

68. The case of the *Al Aqueed* also provides evidence of a connection between Harardheere and the port of Hobyo, the other port that is largely under the control of the Suleiman clan. The *Al Aqueed* was taken from Harardheere to Hobyo, where it was kept until its release following a ransom payment on 12 June 2007.

69. Other vessels that were taken to the “safe haven” of Hobyo were the hijacked Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged *Mariam Queen* and the Danish vessel *Danica White*. Both ships were released from Hobyo port after ransom payments were made in May and August 2007, respectively.

Mogadishu

70. The Monitoring Group made inquiries into five hijacking cases in the Mogadishu International Seaport area. In two cases the hijacked vessels were anchored at the Mogadishu International Seaport, while in the remaining cases the vessels were anchored less than 30 miles offshore:

- The *Nimatullah* was hijacked on 1 April 2007, while anchored at the port
- The *Mariam Queen* was hijacked on 3 May 2007, 12 miles off Mogadishu
- The *Al Aqueed* was hijacked on 24 May, 30 miles off Mogadishu
- The *Al Marjan* was hijacked on 17 October 2007, seven miles off Mogadishu
- The *Dai Hong Dan* was hijacked on 29 October 2007, while anchored at the port.

71. In the case of the *Dai Hong Dan*, the hijackers were security guards under the command of “Dinax”, who was assigned by the Government to provide security at the port. Following the hijacking incident, his guards were replaced by Somali Police Force security under the command of Police Commissioner Qeybdiid.

72. The well-considered timing, location and modus operandi of the hijackers have led to allegations from the business community that the above hijackings were “inside jobs”, actively involving Mogadishu Port security forces.

Piracy and violations of the arms embargo

73. The Monitoring Group has repeatedly received allegations that ransom payments obtained from hijackings have been used for the purchase of weapons. The fact that Harardheere, Hobyo and Mogadishu have been used for weapons

imports and acts of piracy creates opportunities for both pirates and arms embargo violators.

74. Somali pirates are increasingly well armed. Information received by the Monitoring Group from the Government of the Republic of Korea states that the 15-strong group of pirates that hijacked the *Golden Nori* were aboard speedboats and small fishing boats and were armed with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, handguns, grenades and live ammunition.

75. Somali pirate Abdi Yusuf, who was onboard the *Golden Nori* during the hijacking, confirmed in an interview with the Associated Press that ransom money was paid for the release of the *Golden Nori* in mid-December 2007. Puntland police arrested a number of the pirates connected with the *Golden Nori* following its release. In meetings with high-ranking United Nations officials, for example, on 27 February 2008, President Cadde Muse repeatedly stated that Puntland police investigations had revealed that ransom money was used by hijackers for the purchase of weapons, thereby violating the arms embargo.

76. In order to pursue that information, the Monitoring Group contacted Puntland National Security Minister Abdullahi Said Samatar and Fisheries Minister Ahmed Said Nor on a number of occasions by e-mail and telephone. The Monitoring Group was repeatedly promised more information, but to date has not received such information.

C. Role of States

Eritrea

77. The role of the Government of Eritrea in providing support to ICU and the Shabaab was covered extensively by the Monitoring Group in its previous reports (S/2005/625, paras. 36-42; S/2006/229, paras. 15-21; S/2006/913, paras. 15-55; S/2007/436, paras. 11-22). During the current mandate, the Monitoring Group received information that the Government of Eritrea continues to provide support to groups that oppose the Transitional Federal Government in the form of arms and military training to fighters of the Shabaab and arms to a warlord, as follows.

Arms to the Shabaab

78. The Monitoring Group received information that on or about 2 January 2008, an arms shipment originating from Eritrea arrived in Mogadishu. The shipment was transported by road via the Eritrean-Djiboutian border into Zone 5, Ethiopia, and crossed the Somali border near Beletweyne (Hiraan region), before reaching Mogadishu through Buulo Burto (Hiraan region).

79. The arms shipment was hidden under a transport of potatoes and bags of coffee, and consisted of the following: 13 bags of coffee with dismantled RPG-7s; 9 bags of coffee with hand grenades; 4 bags of coffee with anti-tank mines; 12 bags of coffee with three different types of detonators; 2 bags of coffee with pistols; 20 bags of coffee with mortar shells, 27 AK-47 assault rifles, 15 PKM machine guns, 9 RPG-2s, 19 small mortars, 14 FAL assault rifles, 13 rifle-fired grenades for the FAL, 4 M-16s and explosives.

Training of Shabaab fighters

80. The Monitoring Group received information that, towards the end of 2007, about 120 fighters of the Shabaab travelled to Eritrea for the purpose of attending military training at a military base located near the Ethiopian border. The fighters were reportedly of Somali, Oromo, Zanzibari, Comorian, Afghani and Pakistani origin and trained in the use and assembling of weapons and explosives, in making improvised explosive devices, and in assassination techniques, guerrilla warfare tactics, tactical planning, sharpshooting and self-defence.

81. After the initial training, the fighters travelled to different locations, including an island off the coast of Massawa, Eritrea, for practical training in the use of explosives and other weapons. Upon completion of the training, the fighters regrouped in Assab, Eritrea, in preparation for transport to Somalia.

82. The group of fighters split in Assab and used different routes and means of transport to reach Somalia. One group went by road along the Eritrean-Djiboutian border into Zone 5, in Ethiopia, before entering Somalia. Another group went by dhow to Somaliland, Somalia, and used road transport to reach Mogadishu. Another group was transported by dhow to Bossaso, Somalia, where some travelled by road to Mogadishu, while others remained in Bossaso to prepare attacks against the local authorities of Puntland and the Somali Transitional Federal Government. Finally, the remainder of the militia was transported by plane to the Galgaduud region, Somalia. Those who arrived in Mogadishu on 16, 17 and 18 February 2008 participated in attacks against the Ethiopian military and the military forces of the Transitional Federal Government.

Arms to Barre Hiraale, warlord

83. The Monitoring Group received information that on 2 February 2008, Barre Hiraale, a warlord operating in the Gedo and Jubba regions, Somalia, and who has an alliance of convenience with the Shabaab in an attempt to control Kismayo, received an arms shipment from Eritrea. The arms shipment was transported by dhow through Somaliland to Kismayo, Somalia, with the final destination of Bardheere, in the Gedo region. The arms shipment consisted of a large quantity of a variety of ammunition, about 180 AK-47s, about 45 PKMs, RPG-2/7s, mortars, Zu-23s, DShKs, dhuunshilke, pistols and B-10s.

84. The Monitoring Group sent a letter dated 7 March 2008 to the Government of Eritrea, requesting further details concerning the foregoing information. In its reply dated 20 March 2008, the Government of Eritrea informed the Monitoring Group, specifically with regard to the information contained in this report that it “has not provided any arms to the Shabaab, nor has there been any arms shipment originating from Eritrea for the Shabaab”; that it “has not provided military training to Shabaab fighters”; and that such accusation is a sheer fabrication. The Government of Eritrea further stated that it “has not provided arms to Barre Hiraale, who until recently was the Defence Minister of the Federal Transitional Government of Somalia” (see annex I).

Ethiopia

85. As per its previous report (S/2007/436, paras. 28-29), the Monitoring Group continues to regard the presence of Ethiopian National Defence Force troops in

Somalia as a violation of the embargo, encompassing their presence, the importation of arms and materiel for their own use and for the Transitional Federal Government and clans, military flights into Somalia, and providing training without notification of the sanctions Committee, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1772 (2007). Similar violations of the embargo were previously documented by the Monitoring Group in its report dated 16 October 2006 (see S/2006/913, paras. 57-65 and 78-81). In addition, the Monitoring Group has some concerns relating to the level of cooperation it has received from Ethiopia (see sect. VI.A).

Ethiopian military presence

86. There are substantial differences in estimates concerning the size of Ethiopian National Defence Force troops, with the diplomatic community and military observers offering a range from 5,000 to 20,000. The Monitoring Group sent a letter dated 23 November 2007 to the Government of Ethiopia requesting additional data related to the scope of its deployment in Somalia. No reply had been received by the time of submission of this report.

87. The key activities of the Ethiopian National Defence Force centre on supporting Transitional Federal Government institutions and the suppression and elimination of insurgent activities. Military operations are carried out jointly with Transitional Federal Government forces, although the Ethiopian National Defence Force conducts independent intelligence gathering and security-related operations. The Ethiopian National Defence Force assumes command in joint operations.

88. Until late 2007, the largest concentration of Ethiopian National Defence Force troops was in Mogadishu; since December 2007, most positions in Mogadishu have been handed over to newly trained Transitional Federal Government security forces. Nonetheless, a concentrated Ethiopian presence remains in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Beletweyne.

Ethiopian military flights

89. Between July and December 2007, the Ethiopian Airforce organized 25 military flights into Somalia, in violation of the arms embargo, details of which were provided by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (see annex II).

Distribution of arms to the Transitional Federal Government

90. The Monitoring Group has repeatedly received information that the Somali National Army commanders receive weapons, and in particular ammunition, from the Ethiopian National Defence Force. According to a high-ranking security official of the Transitional Federal Government, in March 2007, between 10,000 to 20,000 bullets were handed out from Ethiopian National Defence Force infantry units in Mogadishu to the Somali National Army on a commander-to-commander basis.

Distribution of arms to clans

91. Along the Somali-Ethiopian border, Ethiopian commanders are supplying “friendly” Somali clans with ammunition following a two-fold strategy: to use the clans as a “buffer” against Somali insurgent activity, and to contain the activities of

the Ogaden National Liberation Front, which conducts insurgent activity against the Ethiopian Government from the cross-border Ogaden region.

92. The Monitoring Group has received information that ammunition is being handed out to members of the Majerteen/Rer Biidyahan clan between Burtinle and Goldogos in the Mudug region, and to members of President Yusuf's Mahamud sub-clan in Galkayo. In the Galgaduud region, members of the Ayr clan near Dhusamareeb are being supplied with ammunition.

93. Anti-ONLF and pro-Transitional Federal Government border clans are also befriended by Ethiopian National Defence Force commanders to secure Ethiopian supply routes into Somalia. The key route for Ethiopian military and logistic supplies to Baidoa and Mogadishu crosses the border at Doolow. Along the road to Baidoa, members of the Marehan clan receive ammunition in return for protection.

94. The Hadarmar sub-clan of the Rahenweyn receives ammunition in return for safeguarding the Yeed border crossing, from where supplies are transported along the roads to Hudur and Luuq. Belet Xaawo is the entry point for the southern transit route into Somalia through Buale to Kismayo.

Arms to Somaliland

95. The Ethiopian Government has supplied the Somaliland Armed Forces with arms, ammunition and field materiel. In addition, members of the Somaliland Isaac clan near Buuhoodle received ammunition and weapons.

Training of Somali security forces

96. The Monitoring Group has also received information about training provided by the Ethiopians to Somali security forces (see sect. II.G).

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

97. On 26 November 2007, a C-130 military aircraft with registration number XV308, using call sign RRR5308, operated by the United Kingdom Royal Air Force, landed at Berbera, Somaliland, Somalia, without prior notification to the Committee.

98. The Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 30 November 2007, to the Government of the United Kingdom requesting information and details concerning the above-mentioned flight. In its reply of 28 December 2007, the Government of the United Kingdom confirmed the flight and further stated that "United Kingdom diplomatic staff in Addis Ababa maintain a routine liaison with the Somaliland authorities, and this flight was part of that liaison". With regard to the request of the Monitoring Group for information on the cargo, the Government responded that "As the crew were not required to hand over the airway bill to customs officials in Berbera, it was retained and subsequently destroyed on return to the UK in line with standard practice". Finally, in its reply, the Government informed the Monitoring Group that it expected that there would be further flights (see annex III).

United States of America

99. On 2 March 2008, at around 3.15 a.m., missiles were launched by the United States military on targets in the village of Doble, south-eastern Somalia. This was

confirmed by a United States Government spokesman. The Monitoring Group considers all weapons delivered to Somalia a violation of the embargo, irrespective of the manner in which they were delivered. In addition, the Monitoring Group has received information that United States military instructors provided intensive and comprehensive military training to Somaliland military officers. The Monitoring Group has not been informed that an exemption request for the training, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1772 (2007), paragraphs 11 (b) and 12, was made to the Committee.

100. The Monitoring Group sent a letter dated 12 March 2008 to the Government of the United States of America, requesting additional information. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of submission of this report.

Yemen

101. The Monitoring Group has repeatedly received information detailing the import of weapons from Yemeni arms markets and the supply to Somalia of weapons from Yemeni Government stocks (see sect. III). The Monitoring Group visited Yemen and met with the Government on 9 and 12 February 2008. During the meeting in Sanaa, Government officials denied the accuracy of such information, but mentioned that on 25 November 2007, the Yemeni coastguard had seized weapons on the beach between As Salif and Al Khawbah, waiting to be loaded onto a ship for export to Somalia. According to Yemeni Government sources, the shipment consisted of 148 AK-47s, 146 G3 assault rifles, 148 pistols, 780 rounds of ammunition and 64 binoculars purchased by the exporters locally in Yemen.

102. The Government demonstrated to the Monitoring Group a high number of seizures of illicit contraband (diesel and marijuana) and refugees, destined for Somalia, but declared the above-mentioned interception of embargoed material as the only one in the last year.

D. Weapons and ammunition tracing

103. In an effort to determine the origin of weapons and ammunition transported to Somalia, the Monitoring Group placed special emphasis during the current mandate on obtaining the serial numbers of arms found in Somalia.

104. The Monitoring Group succeeded in obtaining the serial numbers of two SA-7/SA-18 surface-to-air missiles and the serial number of MILAN anti-tank missiles. The Monitoring Group sent two letters to the Russian Federation, dated 18 January and 20 February 2008, and a letter to France dated 29 January 2008, requesting both Governments for technical assistance in identifying the source of the missiles and the States to whom the missiles eventually had been sold.

105. In its reply dated 7 March 2008, the Government of the Russian Federation informed the Monitoring Group that the serial number of the first missile had not been produced in the then USSR and that the marking was different from the one used by the factory where this type of missile was produced. The Government of the Russian Federation also indicated that at a point in time licences to produce this kind of missile were issued to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the former Yugoslavia. Consequently, the Monitoring Group sent letters dated 12 March

2008 to these Governments requesting their assistance in identifying the origin of the missiles, to which the Monitoring Group is awaiting replies.

106. With regard to the second missile, the Russian Federation informed the Monitoring Group, through its letter dated 27 March 2008, that “Judging by the indicated marking, missile 9M39 from party 03-95 with number 03268 was produced in Russia in 1995”. It furthermore stated that “This missile was shipped to Eritrea in the same year through the state company ‘Rosvooruzhenie’”. However, in its reply, the Government of the Russian Federation also indicated that “At the same time, since the marking of the missile is executed in paint, a re-marking is possible. For a definitive identification of the missile, it is necessary to perform its visual examination by our specialists as the missile bears the marking executed differently, which will allow for the identification of the real number of the missile” (see annex IV).

107. With regard to MILAN anti-tank missiles, the Government of France, during a meeting with members of the Monitoring Group on 13 March 2008, informed the Monitoring Group that the missiles were produced in 1978 and that an initial investigation had revealed that the missiles had been sold to a country in the Gulf region, but that further research was needed to confirm the country. The Monitoring Group awaits the final results of the investigation.

E. Somali Arms Markets: fragmentation, transnational links and business opportunities

Introduction

108. In this section the Monitoring Group will provide further details on arms transactions during its current mandate period, demonstrating that the conflict has created business opportunities for various parties with access to stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. In this regard, the Monitoring Group has collected specific information (see annex V) on purchases and sales by the Transitional Federal Government (police and military), the Ethiopian National Defence Force, the Shabaab, warlords, clans and the Ugandan contingent of AMISOM. Information was collected by the Monitoring Group in the field, and was corroborated by critical observers in the region.

109. There are several reasons for the boom in arms transactions at the Somali Arms Markets. First, because of the insecurity prevailing in Somalia, and the perceived collapse of the Transitional Federal Government in the near future, businessmen, warlords and clans are buying arms in preparation for rebuilding their fiefdoms. For the same reasons and for monetary gains, those in possession of arms stockpiles (the Transitional Federal Government police and military, the Ethiopian military and the Ugandan contingent of AMISOM) sell large quantities of weapons and ammunition to active arms traders at the Somali Arms Markets, creating even more insecurity and further undermining the viability of the Transitional Federal Government.

110. While transactions at the Somali Arms Market do not constitute violations of the embargo per se, they are the result of a supply chain connecting arms embargo violators, both sellers and buyers. The Monitoring Group observed this most directly in the case of Ethiopian troops who sell the arms they brought into Somalia in

violation of the embargo. Ethiopian commanders form another link in the supply chain by providing weapons and ammunition to the Transitional Federal Government, some of which end up at the Somali Arms Market. As demonstrated in section II.B of this report, the business community is responsible for importing arms into Somalia in violation of the embargo with the specific purpose of selling them at the Somali Arms Market. The supply chain becomes more complicated where the Shabaab and AMISOM forces are involved and imported weapons reach the Somali Arms Market from looted stockpiles and/or arms caches.

111. In addition, the Monitoring Group considers the buyers and sellers of weapons at the Somali Arms Markets as threats to the Transitional Federal Institutions, and/or AMISOM and finds that their actions undermine the stability of Somalia and the region (see para. 8 of Security Council resolution 1772 (2007)).

112. Persons closely associated with the Somali Arms Market estimate that business is booming as never before and that there are currently three to four times more transactions taking place at the Somali Arms Market than a year ago.

Fragmentation

113. In its previous reports, the Monitoring Group described extensively activities at the Bakaraaha Arms Market and its central role in supplying armed factions with weapons and ammunitions. During the current mandate the Monitoring Group has observed significant changes in the operation of the Bakaraaha Arms Market: at the Bakaraaha Arms Market itself arms are no longer displayed or stored and arms dealers currently have only representatives there. But while the Bakaraaha Arms Market has been losing its central role, other arms markets have emerged in Somalia. As a result of the insecurity and the high demand for weapons and ammunition in Somalia and in the region, the Bakaraaha Arms Market has fragmented into seven known arms markets, at Bakaraaha, Karan, Huriwa, Medina, Suuq Ba'ad and Arjantin, all located in Mogadishu and Elasha, near the town of Afgooye in the Lower Shabelle region.

114. Several factors account for this fragmentation: first, when the Bakaraaha Arms Market traders left the Bakaraaha market they sought security in areas of Mogadishu controlled by their sub-clan. Second, the need for covert transactions forced arms traders such as the Shabaab, which prefers the arms market at Suuq Ba'ad, to open Somali Arms Markets at new locations outside the control of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian military forces.

115. Notwithstanding the above, the various arms markets do not operate independently of one another. For example, arms traders from various Somali Arms Markets will cooperate in some cases to fill large orders placed by buyers or will share purchased stockpiles. Furthermore, some larger arms traders operate simultaneously out of various arms markets. Finally, the Somali Arms Market at Elasha near Afgooye, a subsidiary of the Somali Arms Market at Medina, was established for reasons of proximity of arms purchasers.

116. Because of insecurity in Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, arms traders work underground and only with known potential buyers and middlemen, with negotiations taking place in private houses. Once the trader and buyer agree on the type and price of arms, the trader brings the requested arms to a location distant from the storage facility, where the buyer can inspect the arms before making

payment. Arms traders operate under the protection of important persons within the Transitional Federal Government, such as military or police commanders from the same clan. In a case where a shipment is stopped by Transitional Federal Government police, a Transitional Federal Government official will intervene to ensure release of the shipment.

Evolution of prices at the Somali Arms Markets

117. During its mandate, the Monitoring Group recorded the evolution of weapons and ammunition prices at the Somali Arms Markets (see annex VI) as an indicator of the security situation in Somalia, the types of weapons in demand and the nature of fighting (guerrilla or conventional) occurring at various locations in Somalia. The Monitoring Group observed high demand and purchases in central and southern Somalia, and thus higher prices, of weapons and ammunition used for guerrilla-style tactics, such as AK-47s with folded butt, pistols, hand grenades and RPG-2/7s. On the other hand, there is less demand in central and southern Somalia for heavy weapons such as anti-aircraft guns, which find higher demand in Somaliland and Puntland, where conventional tactics are employed in fighting for control of Laas Anood.

118. During heavy periods of fighting, the prices of weapons and ammunition should normally increase. However, in the current environment of sales of weapons by Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government military and police, prices are decreasing.

Conflict creates business opportunities

119. Because of the high demand for weapons and ammunition and the collusion of military commanders of the Transitional Federal Government, AMISOM and the Ethiopian military, with arms traders, new sources of arms for the Somali Arms Market opened up during the current mandate.

120. According to arms traders operating at the Somali Arms Markets, the largest suppliers of ammunition to the Somali Arms Markets are Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government commanders. Persons closely associated with arms transactions estimate that up to 80 per cent of ammunition supplies to the Somali Arms Market originate from Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian stockpiles. The Shabaab also supplies the Somali Arms Markets with arms from its own caches or from stockpiles taken from Transitional Federal Government security forces during combat. The Monitoring Group received information on the following transactions:

Transactions by Transitional Federal Government officials

121. Fragmentation of Transitional Federal Government security forces is reflected in their purchases and sales of arms at the Somali Arms Markets. Officials from the National Security Agency, the Somali Police Force and the Somali National Army forces are involved in transactions at one or more of the seven markets. In one specific case, both Mohamed Dheere and Qeybdiid sold to the Somali Arms Markets arms found in caches of the Shabaab, which repurchases its own arms.

From arms caches

122. When Ethiopian armed forces intervened in Somalia in December 2006, the Shabaab hid large quantities of their stockpiles of weapons and ammunition in caches (see S/2007/436, paras. 27 and 45-47). Some of these caches have since been uncovered by the Transitional Federal Government, the Ethiopian military or the Ugandan contingent of AMISOM. While some of the arms uncovered are handed over to AMISOM, a majority are kept by Transitional Federal Government officials such as Mohamed Dheere, Governor of the Banadir region and Mayor of Mogadishu, and by Abdi Qeybdiid, Mogadishu Police Commissioner. For example, on 26 December 2007, Mohamed Dheere sold to the Somali Arms Market 8 AK-47s and 2 Non Ops AK-47s, 9 FALs, 8 PKMs, 16 boxes of a variety of ammunition and 20 hand grenades.

123. The Transitional Federal Government military are also involved in the sale of arms originating from arms caches. For example, on 27 November 2007, at night, an arms trader acted as an intermediary between the Shabaab and Transitional Federal Government military commanders offering to sell a truckload of weapons and ammunition from Shabaab arms caches uncovered by the Transitional Federal Government. Shabaab representatives Bashir Yare and Abdirisaaq Farah Abdi, who is believed to hold a Dutch passport, eventually bought the arms.

From stockpiles

124. Transitional Federal Government commanders, working through trusted middlemen operating on a commission basis, supply trusted arms dealers with their own stocks of ammunition. They disguise the sales by informing headquarters that they have used up their ammunition during fighting with the Shabaab. The largest buyer of the ammunition is the Shabaab, who in turn use the ammunition against the Transitional Federal Government.

125. It has been reported that out of every 10 ammunition boxes at their disposal, 6 are sold by Transitional Federal Government military and police personnel to the arms markets and that transactions sometimes take place within an hour after combat. The Monitoring Group received the following specific information with regard to a transaction involving Transitional Federal Government military commanders.

126. Between 14 and 17 January 2008, Transitional Federal Government military commanders Salad Jamaa and Sa'ad Dura, based at Huriwa, Towfiq and Barakat, sold the following arms to arms traders: 38 AK-47s and 24 boxes of ammunition, 12 PKMs, 18 belt feeders and 19 boxes of ammunition, 4 RPG-2/7s and 44 rockets, 8 mortars and 180 rounds of ammunition, 18 boxes of ammunition for Zu-23s, 18 boxes of ammunition for the dhuunshilke, 9 SR-88 assault rifles, 1 box of ammunition and 6 magazines, 120 hand grenades, 6 pistols and 16 boxes of ammunition, and a variety of explosives and other military materiel. The Transitional Federal Government military commanders received \$140,000 for the arms, which are worth around \$300,000.

127. On 15 February 2008, Transitional Federal Government military officers sold to the Arjantin Somali Arms Market the following arms: 16 AK-47s and 12 boxes of ammunition, 4 PKMs and 6 boxes of ammunition, 2 RPG-2/7s and 8 rockets, 8 pistols and 4 boxes of ammunition, 112 mines and a variety of ammunition.

128. On 20 February 2008, General Mohamed Warsame Darwish, head of the National Security Agency, sold the following arms to the Arjantin Somali Arms Market: 30 AK-47s, 4 PKMs, 14 pistols, 1 RPG-7, 180 rockets for mortars, 4 small mortars, 8 landmines, 120 hand grenades, ammunition for a B-10 and BM, 1 Zu-23 and approximately 60 boxes of a variety of ammunition.

129. The Transitional Federal Government military sells not only weapons and ammunition, but also uniforms that are bought by the Shabaab to stage guerrilla attacks against the Transitional Federal Government.

130. Individual Transitional Federal Government military personnel also sell their weapons with the aim of financing their escape from the conflict. For example, on 23 January 2008, six Transitional Federal Government soldiers sold their individual weapons, five AK-47s and one PKM, to an arms trader. They received \$6,000, which was used for the purpose of deserting and leaving Somalia. Also, after the Shabaab overran the Transitional Federal Government military base at Baledogle on 25 January 2008, about 100 Transitional Federal Government military personnel deserted and went to the Arjantin, Karan and Medina Somali Arms Markets to sell their weapons. The immediate impact of the sales was a drop in the price of weapons at the Somali Arms Markets.

From Transitional Federal Government police or military personnel killed in action

131. Transitional Federal Government military and police commanders and the head of the National Security Agency sold weapons and ammunition of fallen colleagues to the arms markets. For example, on 15 January 2008, Transitional Federal Government police officers sold 23 AK-47s, 9 PKMs and 13 belt feeders, 180 rounds for mortars and a variety of ammunition from officers killed in action.

132. On 19 February 2008, the head of the National Security Agency sold to the Somali Arms Market located at Arjantin arms from Transitional Federal Government soldiers killed in combat, as follows: 24 AK-47s with the ammunition still in the assault rifles; 4 PKMs and 4 belt feeders and 8 boxes of ammunition; 2 dhuunshilke; 1 DShK; 1 B-10 and 24 rockets; 8 pistols and hand grenades.

Transactions by the Shabaab

133. The Shabaab uses the Somali Arms Market for generating revenue through arms sales and for arms purchases. Arms sold are obtained from two sources: their own stockpiles (caches) and arms stolen from Transitional Federal Government police and military. During the current mandate, the Monitoring Group received reports of many attacks by the Shabaab, not for the purpose of control of a police station or military base, but to seize as much equipment as possible from the Transitional Federal Government, as the following examples demonstrate.

134. On 30 November 2007, the Shabaab, represented by Abdirisaaq, sold a large arms shipment to the Somali Arms Market located at Medina, originating from an arms cache in the Beletweyne area and transported by three trucks via Afgooye and Barharaf (where part of the shipment was concealed) to Medina. Two deliveries were made to the Somali Arms Market, consisting of 20 AK-47s, 9 PKMs, 5 barrels for the Zu-23, 2 Sekawe seats, 3 dhuunshilke, and a large quantity of a variety of ammunition. The arms were bought by an arms trader called Saaid, for \$42,000 for

the arms and \$9,000 for the Sekawe seats, and \$2,000 was received by an unknown intermediary.

135. On 13 February 2008, Shabaab commander “Rambow” sold to the Somali Arms Market at Suuq Ba’ad 13 AK-47s and 4 boxes of ammunition, 2 Zu-23s, 1 DShK, 1 B-10, 10 FALs, 4 pistols and a variety of ammunition. Most of the arms sold were seized by the Shabaab from the Transitional Federal Government military base at Baledogle, which was overrun on 25 January 2008.

136. The Shabaab does not only sell arms to the Somali Arms Markets to generate revenues, but also regularly buys arms at various Somali Arms Markets. For example, on 22 December 2007, the Shabaab, represented by Abdirisaaq, bought from the Somali arms trader/middleman “Goomey” a large variety of ammunition — 40 AK-47s, 15 PKMs, 9 RPG-2/7s, 14 pistols, 16 FALs, 9 SR-88s, 9 M-16s and 3 telescopic sights for sharpshooting — which were sent to the Bay region. Similar transactions took place on 23 January and 26 February 2008 (see annex V).

137. Finally, the Shabaab uses the services of arms traders active at the Somali Arms Market to buy back their own stockpiles confiscated by the Transitional Federal Government, the Ethiopian military and AMISOM.

Transactions by the Ethiopian National Defence Force

138. A new and important source of arms for the Somali Arms Market, in violation of the embargo, is the Ethiopian National Defence Force stationed in Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu. Ethiopian commanders involved in these sales were initially introduced to the arms traders by Transitional Federal Government commanders, with whom they have frequent contact through combat operations. Ethiopian officers sell from Ethiopian National Defence Force stockpiles through middlemen (mainly at the Medina and Karan Somali Arms Markets) without direct contact with arms traders. The most important middlemen are Transitional Federal Government Commander Salad Jamaa, who is mentioned in this report with regard to organizing sales of arms from Transitional Federal Government stockpiles, and the above-mentioned “Goomey”. Middlemen typically work on commission. It has been reported that the Ethiopian military erases the serial numbers from ammunition boxes before the transaction takes place, in an attempt to conceal their involvement.

139. On 28 October 2007, Ethiopian commanders based at Holwadag, Mogadishu, sold a shipment of arms through “Goomey”, in the Huriwa district in Mogadishu. The arms were transported by two 4x4 vehicles and consisted of 40 boxes of a variety of ammunition, 3 RPG-7s, 4 PKMs, 6 AK-47s and 2 pistols. The arms, which were destined for an Ethiopian military unit fighting the Shabaab at Barakat graves (Mogadishu), were diverted to the Somali Arms Market at Huriwa. The Ethiopian officers who organized the transaction received \$20,000. The arms were eventually bought by the Shabaab through Abdirisaaq “Godane”, their representative at the Somali Arms Market.

Transactions by the Ugandan contingent of the African Union Mission in Somalia

140. The second new group of sellers to have emerged during the current Monitoring Group mandate consists of Ugandan officers from AMISOM selling stockpiles of weapons and ammunition originating from arms caches found in Mogadishu.

141. The Monitoring Group was able, through multiple sources, to assemble the modus operandi used by the Ugandan soldiers involved in the sale of arms as follows: the soldiers have set up a network through their translators who are in contact with the arms dealers; when the arms dealer receives a “wish list” from a client, a representative of the arms dealer contacts a trusted member of the Ugandan battalion stationed at the Mogadishu seaport, where the arms (from Shabaab weapon caches) are stored; he gains access to the containers (during the night), chooses his weapons and makes sure that they are operational; he pays the Ugandan officer (payment is always made before delivery); a representative of the Ugandan officer transports the weapons in 4x4 pickup trucks to an isolated location, for example, at Xooqa Korontada (near the electricity plant) or in the bush, to the waiting arms trader; the weapons are transported by donkey cart in order to avoid being stopped by other Ugandan soldiers who are not part of the network; the smaller arms, such as AK-47s, RPG-2/7s, and PKMs, find their way to the Shabaab; heavy weapons such as Zu-23s and B-10s find their way to Puntland and Somaliland authorities.

142. On 5 November 2007, “Haniinya Badne”, an important arms dealer, gave a “wish list” of arms to middleman “Goomey”, including 4 Zu-23s, 5 DShKs, 3 dhuunshilke (1-barrel Zu-23; typical Somali), 18 PKMs, 8 RPG-2/7s, 30 AK-47s and 50 pistols. The following ammunition was also requested: 25 boxes of ammunition for PKMs; 20 boxes for the DShK; 40 boxes for the dhuunshilke; 145 boxes for the AK-47s; 100 rounds for the RPG-2/7s; 180 boxes for pistols; and 1,800 belts and magazines.

143. Of the total arms requested on the wish list, half of the weapons and the totality of the requested ammunition came from the Ugandan contingent of AMISOM, from their storage facility for uncovered weapons caches. The transaction took place approximately four days after the wish list was presented to the Ugandan contingent of AMISOM. The Ugandan contingent of AMISOM involved in the transaction received \$80,000. The arms were eventually bought back by the Shabaab, via their representative at the Somali Arms Market, Abdirisaaq “Godane”.

144. Between 5 and 8 December 2007, members of the Monitoring Group met Ugandan Government officials in Kampala, in order to present its findings. The Monitoring Group also asked for an internal investigation to determine the origin of the arms allegedly sold in order to conclude whether or not an arms embargo violation had occurred. The members of the Monitoring Groups were welcomed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and met with the Ugandan Special Envoy to Somalia, the Mogadishu Station Chief from the External Security Organization of Uganda, the Chief of Defence of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, General Aronda Nyakairima, and the Director General of the External Security Organization of Uganda.

145. Ugandan officials thanked the Monitoring Group for providing information that would enable them to conduct an internal investigation. General Nyakairima promised an immediate investigation, the results of which would be communicated to the Monitoring Group before the end of the year (2007). During the meetings, in an initial reaction, Ugandan officials denied the involvement of Ugandan officers in the aforementioned transactions and stated further that Uganda was the victim of a disinformation campaign. Since the initial meeting in December 2007, and further to the promised transmittal of the results of the investigation, the Monitoring Group

made several requests for information. However, no results were forwarded to the Monitoring Group at the time of writing of this report.

146. The Monitoring Group also sent a letter to the African Union dated 14 November 2007, requesting a meeting to discuss the findings of the Monitoring Group. No reply to that request has been received from the African Union (see sect. VI.B).

Transactions by clans and warlords

147. With regard to purchases at the arms markets, the Monitoring Group observed an increased number of purchases by clans and warlords intending to again carve out their territory in anticipation of what they perceive to be a possible collapse of the Transitional Federal Government in the near future.

148. On 29 January 2008, the Hawaadle clan bought via their representative at the Somali Arms Market, 24 AK-47s and 13 magazines, 6 PKMs and 8 belt feeders, 2 SR-88s, 2 M-16s and 6 magazines, 4 RPG-2/7s, 19 rockets and 8 transport bags, 12 pistols, 19 magazines and 4 boxes of ammunition, hand grenades, a variety of ammunition for dhuunshilke, DShK and Zu-23. The arms were transported to the Hiraan region by truck, hidden under foodstuffs. (For further transactions involving clans, see annex V.)

149. Warlords also purchased large quantities of arms during the current mandate period. For example, in his continued attempt to control Kismayo, Barre Aden Shire “Hiraale”, a warlord based in the Gedo region, purchased on 2 January 2008, 16 AK-47s, 8 PKMs, 9 FALs, 4 M-16s, 3 RPG-2/7s, 5 mortars, 6 pistols, 2 Sekawes and a variety of ammunition. Between 3 and 6 January 2008, Barre “Hiraale” purchased another 9 pistols, 3 PKMs and 12 belt feeders, 4 mortars and 104 mortar rounds, 2 RPG-2s and 24 rounds, 3 Zu-badeed and a variety of ammunition. Barre “Hiraale” is also mentioned in this report with regard to an arms shipment received from Eritrea (see sect. II.C).

150. During the current mandate, other warlords such as Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Muse Sudi and Bashir Rage purchased large quantities of arms at the Somali Arms Market (see annex V).

F. Re-exportation to Kenya

151. The Somali Arms Markets in Somalia are not only the principal source of arms purchases within Somalia, they also supply buyers such as criminal organizations and rebel movements outside Somalia. During the current mandate period, the Monitoring Group received specific information from several sources concerning the sale and subsequent transport of small arms and ammunition to Kenya, as follows.

152. On 29 February 2008, three arms shipments left the Somali Arms Market at Elasha, Afooye, consisting of arms from different Somali Arms Markets in Mogadishu, such as Arjantin, Karan and Medina. The order was made by Kenyan-Somali cattle traders (who themselves purchase arms from the Somali Arms Market to protect their cattle from robbers) on behalf of different clients, and the arms were delivered to the Somali Arms Market at Elasha before being forwarded.

153. Two separate shipments were bought by Kenyan clients and consisted of the following arms: (a) 14 pistols and 24 boxes of ammunition; 18 AK-47s, 14 magazines and 30 boxes of ammunition; and (b) 4 AK-47s, 6 magazines and 8 boxes of ammunition, 8 FALs, 8 magazines and 16 boxes of ammunition.

154. The two shipments for Kenya were hidden in a truck transporting foodstuffs, which stopped first at Bardheere (in the Gedo region) to offload another shipment for a Somali client, and continued towards Haradera (in the direction of Wajir), where the foodstuffs and the two remaining arms shipments were offloaded. The Kenyan buyers of the shipments were present at the location and loaded the shipments in two 4x4 vehicles with Somali registration. On or about 3 March 2008, the vehicles then crossed the Somali-Kenyan border in a remote area and drove to a location just outside of Mado Gashi (halfway between Wajir and Isiolo), Kenya, where the arms were offloaded into vehicles with Kenyan registration before continuing their voyage to Isiolo, Eastern Province, Kenya.

155. On 15 March 2008, Somali Kenyans presented to a middleman with access to arms traders at the Elasha Somali Arms Market a wish list of weapons and ammunition for two Kenyan clients. The first client requested 12 AK-47s and 6 boxes of ammunition; 8 pistols, 4 boxes of ammunition and 6 magazines; 4 FALs, 6 boxes of ammunition and 8 magazines. In this particular case, the buyer was a militia group in Kenya. The second client requested 3 AK-47s, 4 boxes of ammunition and 6 magazines; 4 pistols, 4 boxes of ammunition and 3 magazines.

156. Both shipments were loaded in a truck transporting foodstuff and clothing. The truck departed from the Elasha Somali Arms Market to Jilib and Bu'ale before reaching Afmadow, where the cargo was offloaded. The arms were loaded in another vehicle, which transported the arms to the Kenyan border with final destination Isiolo, Kenya.

G. Training by nationals of other States

Training by Ethiopia and the United States of America

157. The Monitoring Group has received information that Somali National Army troops, mostly from Mogadishu, are taken for training to the Bilate camp at Awasa. According to Transitional Federal Government security forces, groups of between 300 to 1,000 Transitional Federal Government soldiers receive training in Awasa. The Monitoring Group has also received information regarding police and anti-terrorism training being carried out in Ethiopia. In January 2008, 1,000 Transitional Federal Government police trainees joined the programme in Awasa for graduation in July 2008. In a letter dated 28 February 2008, the Monitoring Group requested information from the Ethiopian Government regarding the training of the Birmadka paramilitary force, but received no reply by the time of submission of this report.

158. The Monitoring Group has received information that Somaliland military officers are receiving training in Ethiopia on special operations and counter-terrorism. The training lasts for six months, and is provided by United States and Ethiopian instructors at three different military bases around Addis Ababa. Officers receive a significant financial incentive and new uniforms to participate in the training, which is very intensive. Upon their return to Somaliland, trained officers

are generally put in command of a brigade, while continuing to receive a salary from the Ethiopian military. The training is part of wider assistance given to the Somaliland army, which allegedly includes arms and field materiel. A letter was sent to the United States Government on this matter.

Training provided to the Shabaab

159. Separate from training provided by Government agents outside Somalia (see sect. II.C), foreign nationals are providing, in violation of the arms embargo, military training to Shabaab militia inside Somalia. The training is provided by foreign nationals with specialized skills in guerrilla warfare, the use and assembling of weapons and explosives, assassination techniques, intelligence, infiltration, improvised explosive devices and sharpshooting. Within the Shabaab, Fazul and Adan Hashi “Ayrow” are in charge of the foreign nationals.

160. The Shabaab has specialized training camps and programmes at locations in most of the south and central regions, such as Balad, El Bur, Mogadishu, Badmadow and Afmadow. Foreign trainers stay for approximately one month at the training camp and then move on to other training facilities. Children as young as 12 years old are trained in the camps in the use of hand grenades and pistols.

III. Somali Police Force

A. Introduction

161. The Monitoring Group has on several occasions received allegations pertaining to potential breaches of the arms embargo by the Somali Police Force. Sources have reported that the Somali Police Force has purchased weapons inside and outside Somalia, that it has become increasingly involved in or supported military-type operations, leading to a “militarization of the police”, and that international donors are funding salaries and equipment for the forces. The Monitoring Group has carried out intensive consultations with numerous stakeholders, especially those involved in police training, such as the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme.

162. In February 2008, the Somali Police Force numbered roughly 7,000, including 1,000 officers on a training course in Awasa (Ethiopia), and 867 officers appointed for VIP protection under the Somali Police Force. According to international donors and the Police Commissioner, of the remaining 5,000 officers in active service, roughly half received training and stipends from international donor funds.

B. Leadership of the Somali Police Force

163. Police Commissioner General Abdi Hasan Awale Qeybdiid took office on 5 May 2006, replacing former Commissioner Brigadier General Ali Mohamed Hassan “Ali Madobe”. Qeybdiid is in command of the entire Somali Police Force, but he has a stronghold in southern Mogadishu, where the Somali Police Force is concentrated at the Gulwadayaal base. General Abdi Qeybdiid came to the post with a number of his own 4x4 pickup vehicles (“technicals”) including some captured from ICU.

164. As national Police Commissioner, General Abdi Qeybdiid is also in charge of the Birmadka paramilitary force, the most heavily armed police force, including “technicals” mounted with Shiilke anti-aircraft guns. This force, which operates as an attachment to the Ethiopian National Defence Force military, with a mandate to “contain violence”, should fall under civilian oversight and rule-of-law provisions.

C. Auxiliary forces

165. According to the Somaliland Police Act adopted by the Somali Police Force, the Mayor of Mogadishu has the authority to direct the police and to discipline police officers and the commissioner. Anyone working under the Mayor is eligible for designation as a “policeman” and any building occupied by the Mayor’s men can by law be turned into a police building.

166. Mohamed Dheere is in charge of the so-called Benadir Force, described as having the largest number of militia members in the Transitional Federal Government, concentrated in the Mogadishu Cirtogte area. Under Somali law the Benadir Force is the second largest “police force” in Mogadishu, being about 400-strong and equipped with around 15 “technicals”. Dheere has the backing of three deputies — Abdifatah Shaweye, Mohammed Osman Ali “Dhagatur” and Nur Hassan Ali “Nur Dhaqle” — who joined him with their own clan militias and are therefore also nominally part of the police.

167. There are also a number of militia leaders without any training or qualifications in policing and with no attachment to any official authority who have taken on the role of “police” commanders. Abdulkadir “Bebe”, who formerly led clan militias loyal to Bashir Rage, a northern Mogadishu warlord, is now operating as a police leader with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

168. When former Prime Minister Gedi left office on 29 October 2007, authority over approximately 65 members of the VIP protection force designated to reinforce the Prime Minister’s security reverted to the Somali Police Force. According to Gedi himself, he has retained a personal militia of 175, which is equipped with four “technicals”, and it remains unclear under whose authority his former bodyguards now operate. A police commander and a number of businessmen also allege that members of Gedi’s militia have joined Mayor Dheere’s force.

169. This myriad of “police” forces in operation has resulted in confusion as to who is wearing which uniform and under which authority.

Photo
Mixed group of Somali Security personnel on a “technical”



170. The problem is compounded by the fact that uniforms are being exchanged between “police” officers and militia members, so that the term “police” as used by the population now often lacks sufficient official or legal definition.

171. The inclusion of Mohamed Dheere’s Benadir Force, his Deputies’ militias and fighters under other “commanders” such as “Bebe”, make the real size of the “police” force hard to assess.

D. Somali Police Force in combat operations

172. During the period of its mandate, the Monitoring Group has observed increasing militarization of the Somali Police Force. The force is frequently involved in active combat situations where “police technicals” are used. Incidents in which the Somali Police Force, the Somali National Army and the Ethiopian National Defence Force forces reinforced each other were as follows:

- On 8 August 2007, police forces armed with four “technical” vehicles were carrying out operations in the Suqaholaha neighbourhood when insurgents forced them to retreat. Police forces returned to the area of combat backed by

heavily armed Ethiopian National Defence Force and an hour-long battle ensued.

- On 9 November 2007, the police, armed with four “technicals” and backed by the Ethiopian National Defence Force military, attacked insurgents in the southern Mogadishu Black Sea area.
- On 8 January 2008, the police fought insurgents in the southern Mogadishu Hodan neighbourhood with assistance from Ethiopian forces based at Al Bakaraaha and the Black Sea junction.

173. Somali Police Force officers or militia in police uniform have also been engaged in battles with the Somali military over proceeds from revenue-generating assets. On 13 January 2008, persons in police uniform were engaged with persons in military uniform in a two-day-long armed dispute over tax collection from public transport vehicles at Howlwadag junction near the Bakaraaha market, in which a number of soldiers and three civilians sustained injuries.

174. There is no longer a clear line differentiating police operations from the deployment of Transitional Federal Government military forces.

E. Somali Police Force and arms

175. The Monitoring Group received information from high-ranking Transitional Federal Government security sources and international observers that the Somali Police Force received new Chinese-made weapons from Yemen in March 2007, which were transported to Somalia by air in violation of the arms embargo. This was denied by the Yemeni Government during a meeting with the Monitoring Group. Flight details have been obtained, and the Monitoring Group is continuing its investigation.

176. In addition, police commanders are frequently mentioned as arms buyers at Somali Arms Markets. In March 2007, 400 AK-47s and 10 machine guns were purchased for the police force from Bakaraaha Arms Market arms dealers Cartan “Bidar”, and Abdi Nure, with the involvement of Deputy Police Commissioner Brigadier General Abdi Mohamed Fidow. Annex V of the present report also details sales and purchases at the Somali Arms Market by Mohamed Dheere and Qeybdiid.

177. According to Somali Police Force Commissioner Qeybdiid and his Deputy Brigadier General Bashiir, only 30 per cent of the force is armed, which allows for an estimate of about 2,000 weapons for the force, which is reported to be in desperate need of more equipment. Nonetheless, General Qeybdiid, Mayor Mohamed Dheere and his deputies sometimes sell weapons to the Somali Arms Market.

178. Officers who adhere to traditional police ethics have become increasingly frustrated by their exposure to risk and the growing control of clan and militia leaders over the Somali Police Force. As a result, Somali Police Force officers and commanders speak of a high number of desertions of police officers who have received formal training. Absconding officers frequently sell their weapons to Somali Arms Markets for between \$250 and \$270 to finance their journey home.

F. Problems with Somali Police Force funding

179. The international community needs to monitor the use of donor funds to ensure that such funds are not diverted for the training of a military force for which an exemption is required.

180. According to an agreement between former Prime Minister Gedi and international donors, 50 per cent of all Somali Police Force police officers receive stipends from international donor funds, through a UNDP project, while the remaining 50 per cent are paid by the Transitional Federal Government. At the date of the last payment in December 2007, 2,777 Somali Police Force officers were eligible for stipends disbursed through the UNDP Rule of Law and Security Programme.

181. The Programme supports a territorial police force that is unarmed or lightly armed, a community-based civilian and professional police service that operates under local administration and according to the principles of the Transitional Charter of Somalia. Its project document stipulates that clan neutrality is to be observed, that efforts of the Somali Police Force are to be linked to reconciliation at community and national levels, and that the police are to avoid involvement in military, or any other matters that may contravene the Security Council arms embargo.

182. It has been reported to the Monitoring Group that, in practice, as trained officers abscond, they are replaced by clan militia who take over their equipment and collect salaries on their behalf. The Monitoring Group heard of repeated accusations that donor money is therefore diverted to provide payment for untrained militia engaged in active combat.

183. To date, no proper identification process including photographs or fingerprints has been put in place making it difficult to assess these allegations. A digitalized database with fingerprinting is being developed together with a training programme for 21 officers, but this new system is unlikely to be operational before October 2008.

184. Stipends for 2007 up to the month of July were transferred by UNDP as a lump sum and collected by the Somali Police Force Police Commissioner and his two deputies, Brigadier General Abdi Mohamed Fidow and Brigadier General Mohamed Jama.

185. During the months of September and October 2007, a new database was developed so that for the remaining months of 2007 payment was collected against signatures from individual officers at local police headquarters and in the presence of a representative of the money transfer company Dahaab Shiil, a police paymaster and a representative of the UNDP Rule of Law and Security Programme.

186. Over the last months of 2007, the provision of stipends by the Rule of Law and Security Programme was reassessed by UNDP and international donors, and no stipends have been disbursed for 2008 so far. The introduction of new uniforms for the police to differentiate the Somali Police Force from other security forces is also under discussion.

IV. Finance

A. General

187. Financing for arms purchases in violation of the embargo is facilitated by a lack of transparent and accountable practices that provide shelter for illegal or sanctionable activities. The Monitoring Group has noted that a lack of oversight, combined with general lawlessness, provides cover for the diversion of public and private funds. Among available funding sources are revenues to the Transitional Federal Government from bilateral and multilateral aid. Other potential revenue sources for federal and regional Governments include natural resource concessions for petroleum, minerals and fish, legal or illegal Somali currency print runs, legal or illegal tax collections at sea- and airports, and at roadblocks. Additional revenue-generating methods subject to possible diversion are fees and other assessments imposed on a case-by-case basis on the business community by leaders of the security services of Somalia. Their recently gained official status as functionaries of the Transitional Federal Government thinly disguised behaviour reminiscent of Somali warlords.

188. Individuals known to finance arms embargo violations through such practices include Mohamed Omar Habeb, “Mohamed Dheere”, the Governor of Banadir and Mayor of Mogadishu; Abdi Hasan Awale, “Abdi Qeybdiid”, appointed as Police Commissioner of the Somali Police Force; Dahir “Mohamed Qanyare Afrah”, businessman and former Minister of the Interior. This list of names is not exhaustive, serving only as an indication of the extent of a problem that includes the implication of highly placed officials in the Transitional Federal Government hierarchy in the financing of embargo violations.

B. Specific allegations

President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed

189. Allegations have been made against President Yusuf by former Transitional Federal Government Ministers and senior Government sources that he has secured bilateral contributions from donor States, and that he has diverted or instructed members of the Cabinet of the Transitional Federal Government to divert, on his behalf, public funds for military purchases.

190. Approximately \$3,520,000 of funding obtained from Saudi Arabia to cover reconciliation costs have been allocated to parties located in or affiliated with Puntland (see sect. IV.C below). Current and former members of the Transitional Federal Government allege that these funds may have been used for purchasing arms in violation of the arms embargo. Owing to a lack of cooperation from the Office of the President, the Monitoring Group could not confirm the alleged purposes for these allocations.

191. Documents that the Group has obtained indicate that President Yusuf directed on:

- 27 July 2007 the Ministry of Finance to pay \$120,000 for military uniforms, and 14,800,000,000 Somali shillings (So. Sh.) for other defence-related items, including the provisions of rations for the month of August (see annex VI).

- 8 August 2007 the Ministry of Finance to pay a total of \$20,000 for “heavy weapons number in total 10, including Zu and Shilka”. A handwritten annotation on the top right-hand corner of the document reads “Secretary (next word illegible). The instruction of the President must be executed (Signed) Acting Minister of Finance 13/8/07” (see annex VII).
- 19 August 2007 the Ministry of Finance to compensate officers of the presidential guards with 5,000 So. Sh. for expenses incurred during the recovery of heavy weaponry (see annex VIII).

192. The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 21 February 2008, inviting the Transitional Federal Government, in particular the Office of the President, to comment on these communications, addressing in particular whether in his view the information described in the communications may have a bearing on the financing of arms embargo violations, and how they might relate to projected expenditures presented by the Transitional Federal Government to international donors. To date, no response has been received.

Former Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi

193. Allegations by former Transitional Federal Government ministers and Somali Central Bank officials and parliamentary reports against former Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi relate to the issue of spending lavishly and unaccountably, and his diversion of public funds for the illegal acquisition of arms, ammunitions and “technical”. A former Governor of the Somali Central Bank, among others, alleged to the Monitoring Group that Gedi acquired 10 to 15 “technical”, with a total of 300 militias in recent months.

194. Mr. Gedi’s resignation agreement with President Yusuf, dated 29 October 2007, states that official personnel of the Prime Minister’s Office and his security personnel and staff should be incorporated within the Transitional Federal Government without any discrimination whatsoever. It adds that, in other words, these personnel are to be integrated in the overall security organs and other departments of the Government as full members with similar rights and responsibilities.

195. Mr. Gedi has stated to the Monitoring Group that the agreement entitles him to keep his old security force consisting of 175 soldiers, equipped either with Kalashnikovs or pistols, along with four “technical”, each with a mounted machine gun, and two vehicles for use by commanders of his force. According to Mr. Gedi, the costs for these troops are to be borne by the Transitional Federal Government, and consequently, he has no funding needs for maintaining this armed force.

Governor and Mayor Mohamed Dheere

196. Politicians, bureaucrats, business people and civil society leaders who have been interviewed concerning the financing of arms embargo violations have confirmed to the Monitoring Group that Mohamed Dheere imposes taxes independent of amounts lawfully owed to the Transitional Federal Government. Mr. Dheere follows this practice as part of his municipal leadership role in the Banadir region and in Mogadishu. The purposes for which Mr. Dheere is using these funds, besides maintaining the most significant armed force in the region, is not apparent to persons interviewed.

197. Given the current laws and legal structures of Somalia, the right of Mr. Dheere to collect taxes is within existing laws. However, the collection of taxes and customs duties is not conducted in an even-handed manner, nor is it based on any consistent rate structure.

198. Members of the business community have estimated customs duties and fees at the Mogadishu seaport for an average-sized vessel as follows:

Loading/unloading	\$7,000-\$8,000
Customs duty	\$20-\$30 per ton
Stevedoring	\$3 per ton
Security	\$10 per guard (usually 2-3 required)

199. In practice, however, a flat fee is usually negotiated for all charges, including security fees, satisfying the needs of port management and staff, customs agents and national police who are supposed to monitor the proper payments of customs fees. In cases where receipts are issued, they reflect smaller sums of money than the actual amount paid.

200. According to members of the business community, Mohamed Dheere and his armed municipal forces are collecting taxes and fees at major roadblocks. The location of these checkpoints may change over time, but they are currently located outside the Mogadishu port, one at Sinnkadeere, on the road from Mogadishu to Afgooye, and at Masla, also outside Mogadishu. Finally, Dheere's forces are also involved in collecting taxes from Mogadishu-based enterprises. However, rates vary wildly and business people usually negotiate payment. Humanitarian agencies transporting food and other requirements have attested to paying anywhere from \$10 to \$50 before proceeding. A former minister of the Transitional National Government further revealed that Deere receives about \$50,000 per month from port charges alone collected at Mogadishu.

201. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Monitoring Group received reports that, around October 2007, Dheere purchased 92 AK-47s, 18 PKMs, 8 RPG-7s, 15 pistols and 2 M-79 grenade launchers, worth a total of \$128,000, from the Somali Arms Markets. Around the same time, Dheere reportedly sold an assortment of weapons worth \$15,000 (see annex IX).

Police Commissioner Abdi Awale Qeybdiid

202. The Monitoring Group has identified a number of income streams to the various armed entities operating under the term Somalia Police Force under the responsibility of Police Commissioner Abdi Qeybdiid. In addition to partial salary stipends provided during much of 2007 under the UNDP Rule of Law and Security Programme, elements of the police are collecting fees and taxes at various roadblocks, sometimes together with the municipal forces of Mohamed Dheere. The Monitoring Group can also document at least a \$1.4 million contribution from Saudi Arabia that was allocated to the Police Force and is thus the responsibility of Mr. Qeybdiid.

203. An example of lack of accountability regarding the activities of the Police Commissioner is the gap between theory and praxis of the revenue agents of the Somali Police Force who are responsible for the supervision of import-export duty collections at Mogadishu sea- and airport, as well as the airports at Baidoa, Johwar, Beletweyne and K-50. Although they are required to provide a daily report to the

Minister of Finance to ensure proper revenue collection at the ports, a former Minister of Finance has stated that no such revenues reports are furnished.

C. Bilateral contributions to the Transitional Federal Government

Overview

204. During the past 12 months, foreign contributions have likely represented the largest source of income for the Transitional Federal Government. However, there seems to be little evidence that donor funds are being invested for stated purposes, and no safeguards exist against the diversion of such funds towards the financing of arms embargo violations. Additionally, the allocation of bilateral aid is difficult to ascertain under current disclosure practices of the Transitional Federal Government regarding the purpose of expenditures and the precise identity of Somali recipients. The Transitional Federal Government under Prime Minister Gedi received:

- (a) \$500,000 from the Republic of Yemen (as part of a commitment from the League of Arab States);
- (b) \$2 million from Algeria (as part of a commitment from the League of Arab States);
- (c) \$2 million from Kenya;
- (d) \$100,000 from the People's Republic of China.

An additional \$1 million was allegedly given directly to President Yussuf by the Government of the Sudan.

Funding for national reconciliation

205. The Monitoring Group is aware that the United States Agency for International Development contributed over \$1.25 million to the reconciliation conference organized by the Transitional Federal Government last summer. The Government of Saudi Arabia has made a significant commitment to the Somali reconciliation and reconstruction effort, in the form of \$150 million paid to Prime Minister Gedi. The money was expected to finance the refurbishing of Government buildings in Baidoa and Mogadishu, expenses for the national reconciliation conference, and expenses related to the interests of elders and other facilitators advancing the reconciliation agenda. During the period of March and April 2007, deposits of \$6 million and \$26 million were made to a bank account in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, opened previously by the Minister of Finance of Somalia.

206. The manner in which these funds were withdrawn and used and the fact that proper accounting was not made have led to allegations, particularly against former Prime Minister Gedi, of corruption and the illegal acquisitions of arms and ammunition and payments to combatants.

207. The Monitoring Group has obtained a three-page document, written in the Somali language on the letterhead of the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic, Ministry of Culture and High Education, dated 8 September 2007, which purports to account for \$26,987,125 of the bilateral financial support granted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Transitional Federal Government. The name Salim Alio Ibrow is typed under an illegible signature, as are the words "the

Minister, Ministry of Culture & High Education/Deputy Prime Minister” in Somalia. A three-page English language translation of the document was provided to the Group, bearing on the last page the handwritten notation: “certified by the PM — Gedi (signature) 11/09/07”. Both Mr. Ibrow and Mr. Gedi have authenticated these two documents and confirmed the content as accurate (see annex X).

208. Official Transitional Federal Government accounting for military and security-related expenditures are as follows (see annex X):

Somali National Army	\$3 453 500
National Police Force	\$1 424 943
National Intelligence Agency	\$1 359 000
Security/defence logistics	\$230 000
Purchase of trucks/lorries for security forces	\$1 528 000
Total	\$7 995 443

209. According to a representative of the donor State, these expenditures are troubling in that it is inconceivable that such military and security-related expenditures occurred in support of the reconciliation process. In a meeting on 29 January 2008, with Saudi diplomats in Nairobi, Saudi officials questioned why \$1,424,943 of their contribution had been allocated for the National Police Force. According to the inquiries of the Monitoring Group, 2,711 officers of the national police, approximately half of the entire force, have been paid more or less regularly through a programme organized by UNDP and funded through other donor States.

D. Somali businessmen

210. The Monitoring Group has received information that Somali businessmen, particularly around the Mogadishu Somali Arms Market, have prospered through active participation in the buying and selling of weapons and have established their own armed security details in their respective spheres of business.

211. Indeed, during June and July 2007, members of the business community around the Bakara area surrendered well over 300 assorted weapons to the Transitional Federal Government and allied Ethiopian soldiers on the understanding that the Transitional Federal Government would offer them protection. However, in the view of the business community, the apparent incapacity of Transitional Federal Government security forces to provide the promised protection in an acceptable time frame led members of the business community to explore, in March 2008, ways of financing their own security.

212. To further underscore the point, a prominent Somali businessman who operates a popular international business franchise in Mogadishu had to temporarily enlist over 500 highly trained militia members to guard a high-level delegation from the United States.

V. Capacity-building

213. The Monitoring Group, in its past and present mandates, has received requests from States and agencies for assistance in increasing their capacity to implement and enforce the arms embargo on Somalia.

214. While acknowledging that the question of inadequate capacity is pertinent in most cases, the Monitoring Group considers that the main element for improvement lies with increased political will of States. This is especially relevant for the three major suppliers of arms and military training in the Somalia conflict: Ethiopia, Eritrea and Yemen. The willingness to implement and enforce sanctions may be increased either by incentives or by the imposition of secondary sanctions.

215. The Monitoring Group is of the view that the provision to States of assistance with capacity-building should be based on combined national and international needs assessments submitted to the Committee, covering equipment and training requirements for customs and border control, including seaport and airport management, air surveillance, financial controls and mine action programmes.

216. The provision of capacity-building assistance to States could include international sanctions advisers deployed in key locations, the provision of equipment, the coordination of training and collaboration with relevant national agencies, in cooperation with peacekeeping missions where appropriate. The Monitoring Group has included this point as one of its recommendations under section VII of the present report.

VI. Cooperation with States and organizations

A. Due process

Letters sent to States

217. The Monitoring Group sent 38 letters to individual States identified in connection with information concerning possible arms embargo violations, as noted in sections II and III above. The Monitoring Group received only ten substantive replies at the time of completion of the current report from the Governments of Australia, Denmark, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Romania, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and Ukraine. Egypt provided a detailed outline of its police and anti-terrorism training programme, for which the Monitoring Group is not aware that an exemption was requested from the Committee. The Secretariat followed up with telephone calls in an attempt to elicit replies from other recipients.

218. Owing to a lack of cooperation received from the African Union Commission and some States, the Monitoring Group requested, in its second monthly report (15 January-15 February 2008), the assistance of the Committee in eliciting replies from States.

Piracy investigation

219. The Monitoring Group sent letters to the Permanent Missions of Greece, Japan and the Republic of Korea to request information concerning the hijackings of the *Greco 2*, the *Golden Nori* and the *Mavuno I* and *Mavuno II*, respectively. Particular

emphasis was placed on the receipt of information that would enable the Monitoring Group to ascertain whether ransom payments were used for the purchase of weapons. Only the Republic of Korea replied to the Monitoring Group, in a letter dated 10 March 2008, with information concerning the hijackers and weapons used, and stating its principle of non-negotiation with illegal entities. Also the Government of Denmark, by its letter dated 26 February 2008, provided the Monitoring Group with information regarding the types of weapons used by the pirates.

Foreign navies in Somali waters

220. In order to avoid violating the embargo by entering Somali waters, the Permanent Mission of France contacted the Chairman of the Committee by note verbale dated 3 October 2007, stating that the French Government would provide a naval escort to ships chartered by the World Food Programme to supply humanitarian aid to Somalia. The Mission asked for exemption as provided for in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1772 (2007).

221. The Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations, following the same procedure, contacted the Chairman of the Committee on 31 January 2008, in order to state its intention to provide naval escort to ships chartered by the World Food Programme. Copies of the letter were supplied to the Monitoring Group through the French embassy in Nairobi.

222. The Monitoring Group welcomed this precedent since current Security Council resolutions do not outline a clear procedure for foreign navies seeking exemption to enter Somali waters (see sect. VII.C below).

B. States

Ethiopia

223. Members of the Monitoring Group travelled to Addis Ababa between 16 and 18 March 2008 to meet Ethiopian Government officials in order to present them the information contained under section II.C, on Ethiopia, and sections II.E and II.G in this report. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the initial agreement of the Government of Ethiopia to meet the Monitoring Group, as expressed in its letter dated 7 February 2008, a meeting never materialized once the members were in Addis Ababa. The Monitoring Group would also like to note that it sent two letters, dated 23 November 2007 and 28 February 2008, respectively, to the Government of Ethiopia requesting additional information on the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia and the training provided by Ethiopia to Somaliland troops, but did not receive a reply by the time of submission of the present report.

Russian Federation

224. The Monitoring Group sent two letters to the Russian Federation, dated 18 January and 20 February 2008, respectively. The Monitoring Group would like to thank the Government of the Russian Federation for its cooperation and specific assistance, conveyed through its letters dated 7 and 27 March 2008.

Somalia***Transitional Federal Government****National Security Agency*

225. On 26 January 2008, a member of the Monitoring Group met with President Abdullahi Yusuf and the Director General of the Office of the President, Hussein Ali Mohamud, in London. The President assured the Monitoring Group of the cooperation of the Transitional Federal Government and in particular the National Security Agency under General Mohamed Warsame Darwish.

226. This resulted in an e-mail exchange between the Monitoring Group and the National Security Agency, during which the Monitoring Group obtained a certain amount of information and a number of documents from the National Security Agency. Upon closer inspection, some of this information appeared to be misleading. A particular document forwarded to the Monitoring Group with the letterhead of the Iranian Ministry of Defence was submitted to an expert for assessment, who contested the authenticity of the symbol of the Ministry, dismissed the use of the English language and idioms, and concluded that the document was a “fake”.

Somali Police Force

227. Police Commissioner Qeybdiid informed the Monitoring Group that the Criminal Investigation Department had in its possession information about specific weapons imports by members of the Mogadishu business community through Bossaso Port. He promised to provide the Monitoring Group with evidence, but despite repeated requests, this evidence has so far not been received.

228. Police Commissioner Qeybdiid and Deputy Commissioner Bashir both informed the Monitoring Group about the interception of two Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns, seven PKMs and four or five RPGs, allegedly sent from Eritrea in December 2007, and destined for Shabaab fighters located at the Bakaraaha market.

229. An offer by the Monitoring Group to trace the origin of the weapons was received, and both officials subsequently promised to send photos with serial numbers. Despite numerous telephone calls and e-mails to both officials and Somali Police Force Spokesman Abdullahi Omar Ibrahim “Shaac Shaac”, who had been designated by the Commissioner as a point of contact, the Monitoring Group was unable to obtain any further collaboration on the issue. The current whereabouts of the weapons are unclear, as is whether or not they have been handed over for safe storage.

Port authorities

230. The Monitoring Group made continual attempts to establish a working relationship with the management and security of Mogadishu Port in order to further investigate information concerning two alleged weapons shipments to the port. In particular, the Monitoring Group contacted Port Manager Abdi Gino by telephone and e-mail and through intermediaries, but failed to receive collaboration of any kind.

Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations

231. In response to accounting documents prepared by the interim Minister of Finance and payment instructions issued by the President of Somalia, the Monitoring Group prepared a written inquiry and sent it to the Transitional Federal Government through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations on 21 February 2008. In a subsequent meeting with the delegation to the United Nations, further explanation and the accompanying documentation were provided. The Monitoring Group sent another letter to the Transitional Federal Government on 13 December 2007, and so far it has not received a reply to either communication.

Somaliland

232. The Somaliland authorities have welcomed the work of the Somalia Monitoring Group and offered their cooperation and support, affirming that they play a strong stabilizing role in the region and in Somalia. The Monitoring Group met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, and the Director of the General Intelligence and Immigration Department. However, owing to delays in preparing a programme for the visit, the Monitoring Group was unable to meet with the Manager of the Berbera Port.

Puntland

233. The Monitoring Group intended to visit the Puntland authorities in the course of its consultations and investigations, and established contact with the Minister of Planning. However, scheduling conflicts and late replies did not allow for the visit to take place.

C. Organizations**United Nations***United Nations Political Office for Somalia*

234. The members of the Monitoring Group met on 5 November 2007 with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, to exchange views and information on the security situation prevailing in Somalia. Several follow-up meetings with the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) staff have taken place since then.

United Nations Development Programme/Somalia

235. Members of the Monitoring Group met with several experts from UNDP Somalia in Nairobi and Hargeisa.

World Bank

236. The Monitoring Group met twice with members of the country team of the World Bank in Nairobi.

Diplomatic community

237. At their request, including for the purpose of exchanging views on the military and security situation in Somalia, the Monitoring Group had various meetings in Nairobi with a number of representatives of the diplomatic community.

VII. Observations, conclusions and recommendations**A. Observations****Militarization**

238. The increasing militarization of all components of the security sector, both in terms of equipment and operations, stands in stark contrast to the reconciliation process supported by the international community. The transformation of the security organizations of the Transitional Federal Government such as the Somali Police Force into clan-based forces armed with weapons obtained from caches and from the demobilization programme defies national objectives, and those behind the transformation can be viewed as active spoilers of the reconciliation process.

Weapons seizures, storage, inspection and tracing

239. The Monitoring Group received information that around April 2007, considerable amounts of weapons were handed over by warlords to the Transitional Federal Government, which later transferred some of them to AMISOM troops. At the same time, the Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government forces discovered arms caches of the defeated ICU, while other arms were recovered following fighting with remnants of the insurgency. While it is understood that the Ethiopians and the Transitional Federal Government keep many recovered arms for themselves, a certain number are handed over to the Ugandan contingent of AMISOM for storage and destruction (mines, explosives and ammunition). Some arms belonging to warlords who rallied behind the Transitional Federal Government were returned to the Transitional Federal Government, while most of the others were kept at the AMISOM base.

240. From the second half of 2007 until the end of March 2008, daily armed confrontations in Mogadishu and in most parts of south central Somalia between Shabaab elements and Transitional Federal Government forces/Ethiopian forces led to short-term victories, from which significant numbers of arms of defeated or killed adversaries remained on the ground. While many of these arms are sold at the Bakaraaha Arms Market, those collected in the field in the presence of AMISOM troops are added to the stock kept by AMISOM.

241. Documents available to the Somalia Monitoring Group dated July 2007 show quantities of arms stored under military tents, and old ammunition in AMISOM waste containers. Other artillery pieces are kept at the compound itself. In section II.E of the present report, the Monitoring Group describes cases of sales from stockpiles kept by AMISOM. Information given to the Monitoring Group in March 2008 indicates that disposal efforts by AMISOM have significantly reduced the size of the stockpile.

International practice in terms of weapons stockpiles and disposals

242. In general, weapons storage and disposal conducted by peacekeeping missions occurs within the framework of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme linked to the implementation of a peace process. As there is no peace in Mogadishu, long-term storage of such arms and ammunition is more problematic. According to internationally agreed practice, the length of storage of seized weapons and ammunition should be as short as possible in order to reduce the risk of accidents or diversion of stockpiles.

243. Furthermore, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations recognizes that “Improper management of weapons collected through the disarmament processes can create security risks similar to those caused by incomplete disarmament. If armouries and other arms storage facilities are not fully secure and well protected, the collected arms can easily be stolen. Rearmament of combatants, increase of violence and crime and the export to other conflict areas might be the consequences”.¹

244. Stockpiles should be stored in lockable ISO containers, within a guarded compound. Dual key procedure should be used, with the commander of the armed force and the United Nations or international force both having a separate padlock and key. The Bonn International Centre for Conversion also recommends this measure in order to “prevent irregularities and pilferage”.² However, the decision on the control of keys to storage facilities should be made keeping in mind the political and military situation prevailing in the country.³ Detailed standard operating procedure for the storage and security of ammunition and explosives should be developed.⁴ Weapons and ammunition should be stored separately. When internationally agreed standards for safe and secure management and disposal of ammunition are not achievable owing to lack of budget, resources, manpower and the quantity of arms/ammunition to dispose of, minimum emergency standards should be developed and implemented.

Letter from the African Union for the lifting of the arms embargo on the Transitional Federal Government

245. The Monitoring Group would like to refer to the letter dated 20 February 2008 from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (see S/2008/178 and Corr.1 and 2, annex I), containing a request for exempting Transitional Federal Government security and defence forces from the arms embargo. The Monitoring Group believes that, as it is mandated to identify ways of improving the efficiency of the arms embargo, it is also in a position to reflect on the potential impact that any change in the arms embargo might have on the conflict.

¹ *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment*, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, para. 96 (1999); see www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/DD&R.pdf.

² See www.bicc.de/helpdesk/methods/methods.html.

³ *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment*, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, para. 97.

⁴ *United Nations Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards*, para. 4.3, United Nations (2006).

246. The Monitoring Group would like to note that the Security Council, in paragraph 11 (b) of its resolution 1772 (2007), provides the possibility of exemption, with prior notification of the Committee, for the purpose of developing security sector institutions, which would seem to include Transitional Federal Government security forces. However, during the past six months, the Monitoring Group has received alarming information related to the fragmentation of Transitional Federal Government security forces, linked to growing competition for influence based on armed power, and the new involvement of Transitional Federal Government officials in the sale of arms at the Mogadishu arms markets. The delineation between Transitional Federal Government security forces, tasked to secure institutions and the population, and the militia of Transitional Federal Government officials with their objective of consolidation of their private power base became almost impossible to distinguish. In addition, a growing decline in discipline of Transitional Federal Government security forces (National Security Agency and Somali Police Force) observed in Mogadishu during the last three months has resulted in the increasing abuse of the civilian population.

247. The Monitoring Group is concerned that providing exemptions to the arms embargo for Transitional Federal Government security forces might create severe undesired effects, placing in jeopardy the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan and the decisions of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference. Any authorized arms deliveries to Transitional Federal Government forces should be conditional on the establishment of strong safeguards integrated into the framework of an agreed security sector reform programme with a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration component. It may be possible to authorize official deliveries on a case-by-case basis, with close and continuous monitoring of their distribution and use. Authorization of arms purchase should also be conditional on the collection and disposal of a certain quantity of arms through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. Any reported misuse of force by newly equipped Transitional Federal Government forces, or reported diversion of official arms, should lead to a halt in the authorization of arms supplies. The proposed embargo advisers could play a monitoring and certifying role during the reception and distribution of authorized weapons shipments for Transitional Federal Government security forces.

B. Conclusions

War economy

248. During the current mandate, the Monitoring Group witnessed continued militarization and growing insecurity in Somalia. The insurgents are gaining momentum and are increasingly controlling territory in Somalia. The Transitional Federal Government, on the other hand, is weakened, not only by fighting with the Shabaab, but also by the activities of senior security officers within the Transitional Federal Government who are involved in sales of large quantities of weapons and ammunition to the arms markets, some of which are bought back by the Shabaab to be used against the Transitional Federal Government. Sales by the Ethiopian military and the Ugandan contingent of AMISOM are further increasing insecurity and are detrimental to efforts by the international community to bring peace and stability to Somalia and the wider region. As a result, in the current war economy, military commanders are profiting from the conflict. An end to the conflict is

therefore not in their interest, as that would negatively impact their opportunity to make huge profits.

Transport and piracy

249. The Monitoring Group has found that the port of Bossaso in the north of Somalia, Hobyo and Harardheere in the central region, Mogadishu, and Kismayo in the south are supplied by weapons shipments coming from at least one United Arab Emirates-based company, Eritrea and Yemen and the African coastline. The Monitoring Group also found that a majority, if not all, of the ports used for weapons trans-shipments have also at one time or another harboured groups or individuals held responsible for acts of piracy.

250. It is clear that whoever organizes arms shipments or acts of piracy is under pressure to do so in coordination with the party in charge of the port in question, making it complicit. The Monitoring Group will continue its inquiries into the question of who exercises control over a particular port in order to be able to ascertain who can organize, profit from, or prevent weapons shipments or acts of piracy in violation of the embargo.

Finance

251. The various segments of production in Somalia have tilted towards feeding the war machinery to the benefit of the militarily powerful and at the expense of the civilian population. Unless the Transitional Federal Government, in cooperation with the international community, is able to design and implement concerted and sustainable transformational programmes, the current economic status quo will continue to drown the massive but uncoordinated donor efforts meant to revive the Somali economic, social and political environment.

252. The risk still remains that donor funding, albeit well intended, may end up fueling the very arms embargo the international community is attempting to enforce, unless appropriate and effective measures for the utilization of donor aid and robust monitoring mechanisms are implemented.

253. Inadequate Transitional Federal Government resource management capacity for revenue collection, natural resource exploitation and donor aid remains a major negative factor in curbing violations of the arms embargo. These challenges and prevailing weak governance structures within the Transitional Federal Government rank and file weakens its own ability to implement the sanctions regime.

C. Recommendations

General

254. The Monitoring Group recommends that:

(a) The Committee assist the Monitoring Group in eliciting replies to its letters to States, in order to allow the Monitoring Group to carry out its work in accordance with its mandate;

(b) The Security Council consider incorporating into a new resolution a provision for exemption from the arms embargo to allow foreign navies in Somali waters similar to the procedure outlined in paragraphs 11 (b) and 12 of Security

Council resolution 1772 (2007). The Monitoring Group considers naval vessels “military materiel”, and their cross-border movement into Somali waters thereby constitutes an embargo violation, for which exemption needs to be obtained.

Arms

255. The Monitoring Group recommends that:

(a) The Committee address letters to States found by the Monitoring Group to have violated the arms embargo, drawing their attention to information contained in the report and to their obligations under the relevant resolutions, and requesting information (with a time limit) on concrete steps taken to ensure effective implementation and enforcement;

(b) Noting the general and complete arms embargo, the absence of weapons or ammunition production within Somalia, and that internal arms transactions and possible export to other States result from cross-border supply chains, the Security Council consider expanding the mandate of the Monitoring Group to include the provision of information on internal arms transactions subject to possible additional measures;

(c) The Committee address a letter to the Transitional Federal Government drawing its attention to the provisions contained in relevant Security Council resolutions for exemptions to the arms embargo for the development of security institutions and the requirement to notify the Committee in advance;

(d) The Committee request the Transitional Federal Government to conduct an independent investigation into the information contained in this report with regard to the sale by Transitional Federal Government officials of weapons and ammunition to the Somali Arms Markets and to send its findings to the Committee within two months of the publication date of this report;

(e) In connection with a letter to the Government of Ethiopia (see recommendation in para. 255 (a) above), the Committee also request the Government of Ethiopia to conduct an independent investigation into the information contained in this report with regard to the sale by Ethiopian military officers of weapons and ammunition to the Somali Arms Markets and to send its findings to the Committee within two months of the publication date of this report;

(f) The Committee request AMISOM to conduct an independent investigation into the information contained in this report with regard to the sale by Ugandan military officers of weapons and ammunition to the Somali Arms Markets and to send its findings to the Committee within two months of the publication date of this report;

(g) The Committee request the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM to put in place efficient respective systems for managing and disposing weapons, ammunition and explosive stockpiles in accordance with international practices. Emphasis should be placed on the rapid destruction of surplus, and the Committee should be informed within two months of the measures taken in this respect;

(h) The Committee address a note verbale to all Member States reminding them of their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions to implement and enforce the arms embargo.

Strengthening of State capacity

256. The Monitoring Group recommends that the Security Council call on donor States and international organizations to fund and deploy international sanctions advisers at airports and seaports under Transitional Federal Government control to assist with oversight in line with international norms and legislation.

Imposition of targeted sanctions

257. The Monitoring Group recommends that the Security Council impose individual targeted sanctions (travel ban and financial sanctions) on arms embargo violators and their active supporters, and on elements who threaten by force the Transitional Federal Institutions or AMISOM (see para. 8 of Security Council resolution 1772 (2007)), and that the Committee designate persons and entities subject to individual measures, including in relation to the draft list mentioned in paragraph 3 (d) of resolution 1766 (2007) and updated by the Monitoring Group during its current mandate.

Annex I

Response of the Government of Eritrea to the Monitoring Group

Permanent Mission of Eritrea
to the United Nations



የኢትዮጵያ ሪፐብሊክ ለአሜሪካ ግንባታ ስራ ላይ የሚሳተፉ የሰላም ጋርዶችን ለመቆጣጠር
በደቡብ ሰላም ጋርዶች ለመቆጣጠር ለሚሰጡ ሰላም ጋርዶች ለመቆጣጠር

20 March 2008

Sir,

I have the honor to respond to your letter of 7 March 2008 alleging “the Government of Eritrea has provided arms and military training to fighters of the Shabaab and arms to a warlord”.

As is evident from the letter, the sources for the Monitoring Group on Somalia have attempted to provide a semblance of authenticity and factuality to their accusations by detailing numbers and types of weapons, methods of delivery as well as routes and modes of transport. However, this transparent and oft-repeated gimmick cannot lend credibility to accusations that are totally without foundation.

Specifically, the Government of Eritrea:

- Has not provided any arms to the Shabaab nor has there been any “arms shipment originating from Eritrea” for the Shabaab;
- Has not provided military training to Shabab fighters. Although, the letter does not mention any date, Eritrea can categorically affirm that the accusation that “120 fighters of the Shabaab visited Eritrea for the purpose of military training, the fighters were of Somali, Oromo, Zanzibari, Comorian, Afghani and Pakistani origin ” is a sheer fabrication; and
- Has not provided arms to Barre Hiraale, who until recently was the “Defence Minister of the Federal Transitional Government of Somalia”.

Moreover, the Government of Eritrea would like to apprise the Monitoring Group on Somalia of the following:-

1. Eritrea maintains no relations with “Shabaab”, military or otherwise. In fact, individuals claiming to speak on behalf of “Shabaab” have repeatedly denounced Eritrea for the role they perceive it played in hosting the conference that led to the birth of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), a broad alliance of Somalis of a variety of political persuasions, who oppose the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia and seek the reconstitution of their country. Eritrea’s role was in fact that of facilitation, without any political imposition, for the Somalis to get together and find their own solution without any external interference in determining the political future of their country.

Mr. Bruno Schiemy
Chairman, Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council resolution 1724 (2006)

2. Eritrea is perplexed by the string of patently false accusations against it, fed to the Monitoring Group on Somalia. Mention could be made of the similar unfounded charge that there were 2000 Eritrean soldiers in Somalia, prior to the full scale Ethiopian invasion of the country. The accusations in the last Monitoring Group report of several air shipments from Eritrea to the Shabaab also fall in the same category.
3. The Government of Eritrea is obviously not privy to the sources of the falsehoods that appear in the Group's reports. But it is certainly not difficult to surmise who these sources might be in order to tarnish the image of Eritrea. On top of the list is the Government of Ethiopia, which has not only occupied Somalia, but which is arming and training an array of warlords, clan militias, and "regional" governments, in addition to the Federal Transitional Government. In this connection, Eritrea finds it unacceptable the failure of the Monitoring Group to report on the glaring and constant violations of the relevant Security Council resolutions on the part of Ethiopia and other member states who support the illegal Ethiopian occupation of Somalia. On a different but related vein, it is not inappropriate to mention that Ethiopia is arming and training the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM), which includes members from an assortment of nations with the express aim of violently overthrowing the Government of Eritrea. Leaders of the EIJM and other anti-Eritrean groups were received and congratulated by Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles and the visiting US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi E. Frazer, on 23 January 2008, according to official Ethiopian press reports; and
4. The Government of Eritrea has maintained its policy of non interference in the internal affairs of the Somalis, including the ARS who have been denounced by Al-Shabaab for being "a secular alliance".

For reasons outlined above, Eritrea rejects the unfounded information received by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and wishes to register its protest in the strongest possible terms that the monitoring mechanism created by the Security Council, regrettably, continues to be used for ulterior motives as evidenced in previous reports. It is important that any information received by the Monitoring Group on Somalia is verified for its credibility and objectivity. Eritrea will remain committed to the arms embargo on Somalia, pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions, and will continue its cooperation with the Monitoring Group on Somalia.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Araya Desta
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

Annex II

Ethiopian military flights into Somalia

Date	Call sign	Aircraft type	Aircraft registration	From	To
2007/07/03	EAF1513	AN12	-	HAHM	HCMB
2007/07/03	EAF1513	AN12	-	HCMB	HAHM
2007/07/15	EAF808	DHC6	-	HADR	HCMB
2007/07/25	EAF807	DHC6	Aircraft registration	HAHM	HCMB
Date	Call sign	Aircraft type	Aircraft registration	From	To
2007/09/10	ETAF808	DHC6	ETAIU	HADR	HCMB
2007/09/18	EAF1571	C130	-	HAHM	HCMB
2007/09/26	EAF805	DHC6	-	HAGO	HCMM
2007/09/26	EAF805	DHC6	-	HCMM	HCMB
2007/09/29	EAF805	DHC6	-	HCMB	HCMM
2007/10/04	ETAF808	DHC6	ETAIU	HAGO	HCMM
2007/10/04	ETAF808	DHC6	ETAIU	HCMM	HCMB
2007/10/04	ETAF808	DHC6	ETAIU	HCMB	HAGO
2007/10/06	EAF805	DHC6	-	HAGO	HCMM
2007/10/06	EAF808	DHC6	-	HCMM	HCMB
2007/10/06	EAF808	DHC6	-	HCMB	HAHM
2007/10/12	EAF807	DHC6	-	HAHM	HCMB
2007/10/22	EAF1552	AN32	-	HCMB	HAHM
2007/10/22	EAF1551	AN32	-	HAHM	HCMB
2007/11/01	EAF807	DHC6	-	HADR	HCMB
2007/11/06	EAF1551	AN32	-	HAHM	HCMB
2007/11/10	EAF1551	AN32	-	HAHM	HCMB
2007/11/11	EAF1551	AN32	-	HAGO	HCMB
2007/11/15	ETAF807	DHC6	-	HAAB	HCMB
Date	Call sign	Aircraft type	Departure	Destination	
04/12/2007	EAF808	DHC6	HAGO	HCMB	
17/12/2007	EAF1551	AN32	HAAB	HCMB	

Source: Information provided by ICAO-Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia.

Annex III

Response of the Government of the United Kingdom to the Monitoring Group



United Kingdom Mission
to the United Nations
New York

28 December 2007

One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza
885 Second Avenue
New York NY 10017

Bruno Schiemsky
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council resolution 1766 (2007)

Mailing Address:
PO Box 5238
New York NY 10150-5238
Tel: 212-745-9337
Fax: 212-745-9239
email: fiona.fraser@fco.gov.uk

Dear Coordinator,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 30 November 2007 (reference S/AC.29/2007/MG/OC.31) requesting certain information in relation to a C-130 flight registration number XV308 operated by the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom confirms that Royal Air Force flight XV308 landed in Berbera in Somalia on 26 November 2007. This landing was part of a routine logistics flight itinerary.

The flight left the United Kingdom on 23 November and travelled to the following places: Akrotiri, Beirut, Cairo, Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Djibouti, Berbera, Nairobi, Mombassa, Lanseria, Windhoek, Abuja, Accra, Freetown, Tenerife and Rabat. The flight returned to the United Kingdom on 3 December 2007.

United Kingdom diplomatic staff in Addis Ababa maintain a routine liaison with the Somaliland authorities, and this flight was part of that liaison.


In accordance with normal procedures an airway bill was generated to cover this flight. As the crew were not required to hand the airway bill to customs officials at Berbera, it was retained and subsequently destroyed on return to the UK in line with standard practice.

The United Kingdom attaches great importance to ensuring the personal security of serving Royal Air Force personnel and it is not therefore our practice to publish names.

The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to maintain its logistical support to diplomatic premises and diplomats in the region and therefore expects there to be further flights.

In this regard, the United Kingdom is satisfied that it is acting consistently with United Nations Security Council resolutions in relation to Somalia.

The United Kingdom Permanent Mission to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to extend to the Somalia Monitoring Group the assurances of its highest consideration.

Yours faithfully,


Karen Pierce
Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative
UK Mission to the United Nations

Annex IV

Response of the Government of the Russian Federation to the Monitoring Group

Постоянное Представительство
Российской Федерации
при
Организации Объединенных
Наций



Permanent Mission
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

136 East 67th Street
New York N.Y. 10065

URGENT

27 March 2008


Dear Mr. Schiemy,sky,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 20 February 2008 (S/AC.29/2008/MG/OC.8) concerning the MPAD of SA-7/SA-18 with serial number 9M39 03-95 03268 03-95 (or M3-95) found in Somalia and to inform you on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation of the following.

Judging by the indicated marking, missile 9M39 from party 03-95 with number 03268 was produced in Russia in 1995. This missile was shipped to Eritrea in the same year through the state company 'Rosvooruzhenie'. The contract stipulated that the purchaser cannot sell or transfer the supplied items, documentation or other information to other countries without the vendor's consent. The Eritrean side did not request this permission from us.

At the same time, since the marking of the missile is executed in paint, a re-marking is possible. For a definitive identification of the missile, it is necessary to perform its visual examination by our specialists as the missile bears the marking executed differently, which will allow for the identification of the real number of the missile.

Please accept the assurances of our highest consideration.


Konstantin Dolgov
Deputy Permanent Representative

Mr. Bruno Schiemy,sky, Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia
established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1766 (2007)

c.c.: Ms. Loraine Rickard-Martin, Secretary
Security Council Committee
established by Resolution 751 (1992)
fax: (212) 963-1300, 963-3778
New York

Annex V

**Arms purchases and sales at the Somali Arms Markets
investigated during the mandate period**

Identity of those conducting transactions at the Bakaraaha, Medina, Huriwa, Karan, Arjantin, Suuq Ba'ad and Elasha Arms Markets	Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction	Role (supplier/purchaser/seller)
<p>Barre Aden Shire “Hiraale” Former minister in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)</p>	<p>16 AK-47, 8 PKM, 9 FAL, 4 M-16, 3 RPG-2/7, 5 Mortars, 6 pistols, 2 Sekawe, a variety of ammunition 02.01.08</p> <p>9 pistols, 3 PKM and 12 belt feeders, 4 mortars and 104 mortar rounds, 2 RPG-2 and 24 rounds, 3 Zu-badeed, a variety of ammunition 03-06.01.08</p>	<p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Purchased the arms</p>
<p>Somali Arms Market (SAM) traders</p>	<p>Wish list from Shabaab given to arms trader on 5 Nov 2007: Weapons: 4 ZU-23, 5 DShK, 3 dhuunshilke (1 barrel ZU-23 typical Somali), 18 PKM, 8 RPG-2/7, 30 AK-47, 50 pistols. Ammunition: 25 boxes of ammo for PKM; 20 boxes for the DShK; 40 boxes for the dhuunshilke; 145 boxes for the AK-47; 100 rounds for the RPG-2/7; 180 boxes for pistols; 1,800 belts and magazines. 09.11.2007</p>	<p>Half of the weapons and the totality of the ammunition were sold by AMISOM soldiers for \$80,000 to the arms trader called “Goomey”. The arms were purchased by the Shabaab.</p>

	<p>40 boxes of a variety of ammunition; 3 RPG-7; 4 PKM; 6 AK-47; 2 pistols 28.10.2007</p> <p>A variety of ammunition 25.11.2007</p> <p>A truckload of weapons and ammunition 27.11.2007</p> <p>20 AK-47, 9 PKM, 5 barrels for the ZU-23, 2 Sekawe seats, 3 dhuunshilke, a large quantity of a variety of ammunition 30.11.2007</p> <p>180 AK-47, 45 PKM, 27 RPG-2/7, 3 Dhuunshilke, 11 Zu-badeed, 16 SR-88, 9 M-16, 38 pistols, 200 grenades, 109 M-72 LAW, 60 pieces of night vision equipment, 48 boxes of a variety of ammunition, 9 mortars, magazines for the AK-47 On or about 04.01.2008</p>	<p>Bought by the arms trader “Goomey” from the Ethiopian soldiers based at Holwadag for the price of \$20,000. The arms were purchased by the Shabaab.</p> <p>Sold by the Shabaab to the arms trader called “Goomey”</p> <p>Sold by the TFG military to the arms trader called “Goomey”. The arms were purchased by the Shabaab. Origin: arms caches.</p> <p>Sold by the Shabaab to the arms trader called “Saaid”. The arms dealer paid \$42,000 for the arms and \$9,000 for the Sekawe seats. Of that amount, \$2,000 was given to the unknown intermediary. In total the Shabaab received \$49,000. Origin: arms cache in the Beletweyne area</p> <p>Businessmen brought the arms shipment for traders at the Bakaraaha Arms Market (BAM). Transport by dhow from Bossaso and through El Der to El Ma’an port. The shipment was transported by vehicle to Karan (Mogadishu). The traders paid the businessmen a down payment of \$200,000.</p>
--	--	--

	<p>23 AK-47, 9 PKM and 13 belt feeders, 180 rounds for mortars, a variety of ammunition 01.08</p> <p>38 AK-47 and 24 boxes of ammunition, 12 PKM and 18 belt feeders and 19 boxes of ammunition, 4 RPG-2/7 and 44 rockets, 8 mortars and 180 rounds, 18 boxes of ammunition for Zu-23, 18 boxes of ammunition for the dhuunshilke, 9 SR-88 and 1 box of ammunition and 6 magazines, 120 hand grenades, 6 pistols and 16 boxes of ammunition, a variety of explosives and other military materiel 14-17.01.08</p> <p>5 AK-47 and 1 PKM 23.01.08</p> <p>18 boxes of ammunition for AK-47, 11 boxes of ammunition for PKM and 24 belt feeders, 28 rockets for the RPG-2/7, 42 rounds of ammunition for the M-79 grenade launcher, 12 pistols 23.01.08</p> <p>14 AK-47 and 6 boxes of ammunition, 6 FAL and 4 boxes of ammunition, 4 PKM and 3 belt feeders, 4 RPG-2/7 and 18 rockets, 30 hand grenades, 2 DShK and spare parts, 6 pistols, a variety of other ammunition 24.01.08</p>	<p>Sold by individual police officers (TFG) to BAM traders. Origin: police officers killed in action</p> <p>Sold by TFG military based in Towfiq, Huriwa and Barakat to arms traders. The TFG military representative was Cage and the traders' representative was "Goomey". The traders paid \$140,000. The shipment is worth \$300,000.</p> <p>Sold by 6 TFG military to an arms trader for \$6,000.</p> <p>Sold by arms trader at Arjantin Arms Market to Bashir Yare (Shabaab), who gave it to Shabaab Commander "Rambow" who transported it to El Bur.</p> <p>Purchased at Arjantin Arms Market by TFG Minister Ibrahim Habsade</p>
--	---	--

	<p>9 AK-47 and 16 boxes of ammunition, 8 PKM, 7 pistols, 6 RPG-2/7 and 20 rockets, a variety of ammunition 24-27.01.08</p> <p>30 AK-47, 4 PKM, 14 pistols, 1 RPG-7, 180 rounds for mortars, 4 mortars, 8 landmines, 120 hand grenades, ammunition for B-10, 1 Zu-23 and approximately 60 boxes of a variety of ammunition 20.02.08</p>	<p>Purchased at Arjantin Arms Market by the arms dealer "Artan" on behalf of the TFG Presidential Office to protect Villa Somalia</p> <p>Sold by General Darwish, head of the National Security Agency, to a trader at Arjantin Arms Market</p>
Shabaab	<p>300 AK-47, 18 PKM, 30 RPG-7, 20 M-79 grenade launchers, 18 M-72 LAW, 120 boxes of ammunition for AK-47 and PKM, 1,000 grenades and mines Oct-Nov 2007</p> <p>The Shabaab brought at least 6 times arms to the BAM to be sold, with the smallest transaction valued at \$23,000 Oct-Nov 2007</p> <p>40 boxes of a variety of ammunition; 3 RPG-7; 4 PKM; 6 AK-47; 2 pistols 28.10.2007</p> <p>Weapons: 4 ZU-23, 5 DShK, 3 dhuunshilke (1 barrel ZU-23 typical Somali), 18 PKM, 8 RPG-2/7, 30 AK-47, 50 pistols. Ammunition: 25 boxes of ammo for PKM; 20 boxes for the DShK; 40 boxes for the</p>	<p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Sold the arms</p> <p>Purchased the arms from the Ethiopian military through the arms trader "Goomey" for more than \$20,000</p> <p>Purchased the arms from AMISOM through the arms trader "Goomey" for more than \$80,000</p>

	<p>dhuunshilke; 145 boxes for the AK-47; 100 rounds for the RPG-2/7; 180 boxes for pistols; 1,800 belts and magazines. 09.11.2007</p> <p>A variety of ammunition 25.11.2007</p> <p>A truckload of weapons and ammunition from the TFG military 27.11.2007</p> <p>20 AK-47, 9 PKM, 5 barrels for the ZU-23, 2 Sekawe seats, 3 dhuunshilke, a large quantity of a variety of ammunition 30.11.2007</p> <p>A large variety of ammunition, 40 AK-47, 15 PKM, 9 RPG-2/7, 14 pistols, 16 FAL, 9 SR-88, 9 M-16 and 3 telescopic sight for sharpshooting 22.12.07</p> <p>18 boxes of ammunition for AK-47, 11 boxes of ammunition for PKM and 24 belt feeders, 28 rockets for the RPG-2/7, 42 rounds of ammunition for the M-79 grenade launcher, 12 pistols 23.01.08</p>	<p>Sold the ammunition to “Goomey”</p> <p>Purchased from the TFG military through the arms trader “Goomey”. Origin: arms caches.</p> <p>Sold by the Shabaab to the arms trader called “Saaid”. The arms dealer paid \$42,000 for the arms and \$9,000 for the Sekawe seats. Of that amount, \$2,000 was given to the unknown intermediary. In total the Shabaab received \$49,000. Origin: arms cache in the Beletweyne area.</p> <p>Purchased by the Shabaab from the arms dealer “Goomey”</p> <p>Purchased by Bashir Yare (Shabaab) at Arjantin Arms Market. He gave the arms to Shabaab Commander “Rambow”, who transported it to El Bur.</p>
--	---	--

	<p>13 AK-47 and 4 boxes of ammunition, 2 Zu-23, 1 DShK, 1 B-10, 10 FAL, 4 pistols, a variety of ammunition 13.02.08</p> <p>2 DShK, 1 dhuunshilke, 6 PKM, 28 AK-47, 4 RPG-2/7, 84 landmines, 50 hand grenades, 3 SR-88, 2 M-16, 100 ETH uniforms and 200 TFG uniforms 26.02.08</p>	<p>Sold by Commander "Rambow" to the SAM at Suuq Ba'ad. Most of the arms sold were taken from the TFG military base at Baledogle, overrun by the Shabaab on 25.01.08</p> <p>Purchased by the Shabaab at Arjantin Arms Market</p>
Transitional Federal Government officials	<p>The TFG brought at least 4 times arms to the BAM to be sold, with the smallest transaction valued at \$12,000 Oct-Nov 2007</p> <p>A truckload of weapons and ammunition 27.11.2007</p> <p>23 AK-47, 9 PKM and 13 belt feeders, 180 rounds for mortars, a variety of ammunition 01.08</p> <p>38 AK-47 and 24 boxes of ammunition, 12 PKM and 18 belt feeders and 19 boxes of ammunition, 4 RPG-2/7 and 44 rockets, 8 mortars and 180 rounds, 18 boxes of ammunition for Zu-23, 18 boxes of ammunition for the dhuunshilke, 9 SR-88 and 1 box of ammunition and 6 magazines, 120 hand grenades, 6 pistols and 16 boxes of ammunition, a variety of explosives and other military materiel 14-17.01.08</p>	<p>Sold the arms</p> <p>Sold the arms to the Shabaab through the arms trader "Goomey". Origin: arms caches</p> <p>Sold by individual police officers (TFG) to BAM traders. Origin: police officers killed in action.</p> <p>Sold by TFG military based in Towfiq, Huriwa and Barakat to arms traders. The TFG military representative was Cage and the traders' representative was "Goomey". The traders paid \$140,000. The shipment is worth \$300,000.</p>

	<p>5 AK-47 and 1 PKM 23.01.08</p> <p>16 AK-47 and 12 boxes of ammunition, 4 PKM and 6 boxes of ammunition, 2 RPG-2/7 and 8 rockets, 8 pistols and 4 boxes of ammunition, 112 mines, a variety of ammunition 15.02.08</p> <p>24 AK-47 with ammunition in the assault rifles, 4 PKM with 4 belt feeders and 8 boxes of ammunition, 2 dhuunshilke, 1 DShK, 1 B-10 and 24 rounds of ammunition, 8 pistols, hand grenades 19.02.08</p> <p>3 AK-47 and 8 boxes of ammunition, 3 PKM, 1 SR-88, 6 pistols 19.02.08</p> <p>30 AK-47, 4 PKM, 14 pistols, 1 RPG-7, 180 rounds for mortars, 4 mortars, 8 landmines, 120 hand grenades, ammunition for B-10, 1 Zu-23 and approximately 60 boxes of a variety of ammunition 20.02.08</p>	<p>Sold by 6 TFG military to an arms trader for \$6,000</p> <p>Sold by TFG military to a trader at Arjantin Arms Market</p> <p>Sold by General Mohamed Warsame Darwish, head of NSA, to a trader at Arjantin Arms Market</p> <p>Purchased by General Mohamed Warsame Darwish, head of NSA, from a trader at Arjantin Arms Market</p> <p>Sold by General Mohamed Warsame Darwish, head of NSA, to a trader at Arjantin Arms Market</p>
<p>Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Dheere” Governor of Banadir region and Mayor of Mogadishu</p>	<p>92 AK-47, 18 PKM, 8 RPG-7, 15 pistols, 2 M-79 grenade launchers Oct-Nov 2007</p>	<p>Purchased the arms</p>

	<p>Brought arms to the BAM to be sold, with the transaction valued at \$15,000 Oct-Nov 2007</p> <p>14 pistols, 18 AK-47, 6 FAL, 8 PKM and 2 non-ops PKM, a variety of ammunition 11 and 12.12.07</p> <p>6 M-16, 8 pistols, 4 PKM 28.12.07</p> <p>9 FAL, 8 AK-47 and 2 Non Ops AK-47, 8 PKM, 16 boxes of a variety of ammunition, 20 hand grenades 26.12.07</p> <p>4 FAL, 6 PKM, 4 pistols, 1 DShK, a variety of ammunition 09.01.08</p> <p>18 AK-47 and a large quantity of ammunition, 4 PKM and 8 boxes of ammunition, 3 RPG-2/7 and 8 rockets, 4 pistols and a large quantity of ammunition, 1 B-10 and 14 rounds of ammunition, 114 mines and hand grenades 15.02.08</p>	<p>Sold the arms</p> <p>Sold the arms</p> <p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Sold the arms. Origin: arms caches</p> <p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Sold the arms to a trader at Arjantin Arms Market</p>
<p>Col. Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybdiid Police Commissioner, Banadir region</p>	<p>87 AK-47, 6 RPG-7, 22 PKM, 8 pistols, 12 magazines for pistols, belts Oct-Nov 2007</p> <p>Brought arms to the BAM to be sold, with the transaction valued at \$15,000 Oct-Nov 2007</p>	<p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Sold the arms</p>

	13 AK-47, 6 PKM, 2 RPG-7, 17 pistols 11-12.12.07	Sold the arms
	4 AK-47 and 16 belts for magazines, 6 PKM, 8 pistols, a variety of ammunition 13.01.08	Purchased the arms
Mohamed Osman Ali “Dhagatur” Deputy Mayor Mogadishu	10 PKM, 6 RPG-7, 2 Sekawe, 4 pistols, magazines for the AK-47, a variety of ammunition Oct-Nov 2007	Purchased the arms
Colonel Farah Abdulle Siad “Garam Garam”, TFG	12 pistols, 8 PKM, 6 M-16, 1 RPG-7 and 7 rounds of ammunition, a variety of ammunition for SR-88, M-16, pistols and PKM, magazines for ammunition 28.12.07	Purchased the arms
Ibrahim Habsade Minister of Transport TFG	14 AK-47 and 6 boxes of ammunition, 6 FAL and 4 boxes of ammunition, 4 PKM and 3 belt feeders, 4RPG-2/7 and 18 rockets, 30 hand grenades, 2 DShK and spare parts, 6 pistols, a variety of other ammunition 24.01.08	Purchased the arms at Arjantin Arms Market
Presidential Office – President Yusuf (TFG)	9 AK-47 and 16 boxes of ammunition, 8 PKM, 7 pistols, 6 RPG-2/7 and 20 rockets, a variety of ammunition 24-27.01.08	Purchased the arms at Arjantin Arms Market through the arms trader “Artan” to protect Villa Somalia, the official residence of the TFG President.
Yusuf Ibrahim Hagar “Dabageed” Governor of Hiraan	215 AK-47, 20 PKM, 95 RPG-7, 80 pistols, a variety of ammunition Oct-Nov 2007	Purchased the arms

AMISOM - Uganda	<p>Wish list from Shabaab given to an arms trader on 5 Nov 2007: Weapons: 4 ZU-23, 5 DShK, 3 dhuunshilke (1 barrel ZU-23 typical Somali), 18 PKM, 8 RPG-2/7, 30 AK-47, 50 pistols. Ammunition: 25 boxes of ammo for PKM; 20 boxes for the DShK; 40 boxes for the dhuunshilke; 145 boxes for the AK-47; 100 rounds for the RPG-2/7; 180 boxes for pistols; 1,800 belts and magazines. 09.11.2007</p>	<p>Half of the weapons and the totality of the ammunition was sold by AMISOM soldiers for \$80,000 to the arms trader "Goomey". The arms were purchased by the Shabaab.</p>
Clans	<p>49 AK-47 and 180 magazines, 18 PKM, 6 RPG-2/7 and 28 rounds, 12 pistols 14.01.08</p> <p>28 AK-47, 9 PKM, 8 RPG-2/7 and 20 rounds, a large quantity of a variety of ammunition 14.01.08</p> <p>42 AK-47, 10 boxes of ammunition and 6 magazines, 12 SR-88 and 6 boxes of ammunition, 14 PKM, 16 belt feeders and 8 boxes of ammunition, 2 DShK, 6 boxes of ammunition and 8 belt feeders, 4 dhuunshilke and 9 boxes of ammunition, 8 RPG-2/7 and 19 rockets, 12 pistols and 7 boxes of ammunition, 120 land mines, 60 hand grenades 16-17.01.08</p>	<p>Purchased by the Marehaan clan (Jubba)</p> <p>Purchased by the Hawale and Galjeel clan (Hiraan)</p> <p>Purchased by the Rahenweyne clan</p>

	<p>12 AK-47, 2 Zu-23 and 2 boxes of ammunition, a variety of ammunition 23.01.08</p> <p>24 AK-47 and 13 magazines, 6 PKM and 8 belt feeders, 2 SR-88, 2 M-16 and 6 magazines, 4 RPG-2/7 , 19 rockets and 8 bags to transport the rockets, 12 pistols, 19 magazines and 4 boxes of ammunition, hand grenades, A variety of ammunition for dhuunshilke, DShK, ZU-23 29.01.08</p> <p>214 AK-47, 8 PKM, 5 SR-88, 12 FAL, 13 pistols, 8 RPG-2/7, 5 mortars, 60 mines, 2 dhuunshilke, 1 DShK, 6 M-16, 140 magazines, a variety of ammunition 29.01.08</p>	<p>Purchased by the Rahenweyne clan</p> <p>Purchased by the Hawaadle clan at the arms market through their representative Osman Dheere. The arms were transported to the Hiraan region in a truck transporting foodstuffs.</p> <p>Purchased by the Marehaan clan at the arms market via their representative Saaid Dahir. The arms were transported to Bardheere.</p>
Abdi “Waal” Nur Siad, warlord	<p>98 AK-47, 12 PKM, 8 RPG-7, 3 DShK, 2 dhuunshilke Oct-Nov 2007</p>	Purchased the arms
Abdirahman, Mohamud Gedi “Wiif”	<p>11 PKM, 2 RPG-7, 3 Sekawe, 5 pistols, magazines for the AK-47, a variety of ammunition Oct-Nov 2007</p>	Purchased the arms
Abdulkadir M. Nur “Eno”	<p>Wish list of 16.12: 16 PKM, 28 AK-47 with folded butt, 6 RPG-2/7, 8 pistols, 3 Zu-badeed (for speedboats), a variety of ammunition, 20 rounds for the RPG-2/7, for each of the weapons “Eno” wants 1,200 rounds of ammunition, Rifle fired grenades for the AK-47, magazines for the AK-47</p>	Wish list presented to the arms trader Bashir Weyne

	9 PKM, 20 AK-47, 4 RPG-2/7, 2 Zu-badeed, all of the requested ammunition Around 20.12.07	Purchased the arms from the presented wish list
	16 AK-47 and magazines, 8 PKM, 4 FAL, 6 pistols, 4 RPG-2/7, 9 M-16, a variety of ammunition 28.12.07	Purchased the arms. Wish list given to the arms traders on 25.12.07
Ali Dheere	9 AK-47, 6 PKM, 8 pistols, 120 magazines, a variety of ammunition 02.01.08	Purchased the arms
Suuley	18 AK-47, 12 pistols, 3 RPG-2/7, 6 M-16, a variety of ammunition 02.01.08	Purchased the arms
Bashir Rage, warlord	9 AK-47, 2 PKM and 6 belt feeders, 4 SR-88, 2 M-16, 1 Zu-badeed, a variety of ammunition 09.01.08	Purchased the arms
Muse Suudi Yalahow, warlord	14 AK-47 and 24 boxes of ammunition, 3 PKM and 12 boxes of ammunition, 2 RPG-2/7 and 14 rockets, 1 Zu-badeed and 8 boxes of ammunition, 2 B-10 and 20 rounds of ammunition 13-15.02.08	Purchased the arms and transported to Baidoa area
Mohamed Afrah Qanyare, warlord	16 AK-47, 5 PKM, 3 SR-88, 4 RPG-2/7, 6 pistols and a large quantity of a variety of ammunition 13-15.02.08	Purchased the arms

Dhuunshilke = 1-barrel Zu-23 mounted on a tripod.

Sekawe = 1-barrel Zu-23 with a seat for the gunner.

Annex VI

Letter dated 27 July 2007 from President Yusuf to the Minister of Finance



THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA
THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Muqdisho, July 27, 2007
JS-XM/050/06/2007

KU: Wasaaradda Maaliyadda
OG: Abbaanduulaha Xoogga Dalka Soomaaliyeed

Waxaa la farayaa Wasaaradda Maaliyadda in ugu dambeyn Sabtidan ay bishu tahay 28-ka bisha Luuliyo, ay siiso Taliyaha Ciidanka lacagta hoos ku xusan:

1. 14 bilyan iyo 800 oo milyan Sh. So. oo ah gunnaddii ciidanka.
2. 1 bilyan Sh. So. serviska taliyaha
3. 1 bilyan Sh. So. dayactir gaadiid iyo daawo iyo stationary loogu tala galay dugsiyada tababarka ee Bali doogle iyo Daynuunaay
4. \$US 120,000 (Boqol iyo Labaatan Kun) oo Dollar, oo loogu tala galay Tuutaha Askarta. (4000) askari.
5. In la siiyo ration(kii) ciidanka bisha August.

Waxaan filayaa in aad u fulisaan amarkan sida uu yahay.

Cabdullaahi Yuusuf Axmed
Madaxweynaha Dawladda



14,800,000,000	Sh
1,000,000,000	u
1,000,000,000	u
<hr/>	
1,120,000,000	\$
<hr/>	
120,000	
<hr/>	
1,240,000	\$

Mugdisho, Villa Somalia
E-mailto: adam_somalia@yahoo.ca
Tel: +2525 983389/+2521 554 4450/E-fax: +1 209 439 3322
Satphone: +88 216 3411 0002

[Translation provided by the Monitoring Group]

Mogadishu, July 27 2007
JS-XM/050/06/2007

To: Minister of Finance
CC: Commander of Somali National Forces

I am advising the Minister of Finance that no later than Saturday 28 July it should provide to the Force Commander the funds recorded below:

1. 14 billion, 800 million So.Sh. for troop payment
2. 1 billion So.Sh. for the commander's services
3. 1 billion So.Sh. for vehicle repair, medicines, and stationary for the training schools at Bali Doogle and Daynuunay
4. US\$ 120,000 (one hundred and twenty thousand) for military uniforms
5. Provide rations for the month of August

I believe that you will carry out this instruction as is.

Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed
President

Annex VII

Letter dated 8 August 2007 from President Yusuf to the Minister of Finance



THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA
THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

*Xooga Madaxweyne Yusuf
Wala Fulyo Afkari
Madaxweyne
SHE
MS W/ Madaxweyne
13/08/07*

Mugdisho, agoosto 08, 2007
JS-XM/060/008/2007

Ku: Wasirka Maaliyadda

Ujeeddo Codsii Bixiia Kharaj

Mudane wasiir,
Waxaan kuu soo gudbinayaa kharaj ku baxay soo uruurinta hubka waaweyn oo gaarayaa ilaa 10 oo ay ku jiraan Zu yaal iyo Shiika. Hubkaasi hadda waxaa la keenay oo uu yaallaas Madaxtooyada Gudaheeda waxaana soo qabqabtay askar iyo sraakiil ka tirsan Madaxtooyada oo ay u suurtoowday in ay xog ku helaan meeshaa hubkaasi yaalaay

Ahddaba waxaa uguna baxay lacag dhan 15,000 oo Dollar hubka iyo gaadiidka ay keeneen. 5000 oo dheeraad ahna waxaa hadda ku xiraa hal gaari iyo qori Shiika ah.

Waxaan ku farayaa inaa bixisid lagactaas iyada ah oo isku gaareysa 20. 000 (Labaatan Kun) oo dollar.

Cabdullaahi Yuusuf Axmed
Madaxweynaha Dawladda



Mugdisho, Villa Somalia
E-mailto: adam_somalia@yahoo.ca
Tel: +2525 983389/+2521 554 4450/E-fax: +1 209 439 3322
Satphone: +88 216 3411 0002

[Translation provided by Monitoring Group]

Mogadishu, August 08, 2007
JS-XM/060/008/2007

To: Minister of Finance

Subject: Request for Payment of Expenses

Dear Minister,

I am relaying to you expenses paid for the collection of heavy weapons number in total 10, including Zu and Shilka. Those weapons, which were brought to and are now within the Presidency, were seized by soldiers and officers of the Presidency who succeeded in discovering their secret location.

The total cost incurred for the weapons and vehicles they brought was 15,000 dollars. An additional 5,000 is linked to one vehicle and Shilka.


I advise you to pay this money, which totals 20,000 dollars.

Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed
President

(Handwritten annotation in the top right corner reads "Secretary [word illegible]__ The instruction of the president must be executed. [signed] Acting Minister of Finance. 13/08/07)

Annex VIII

Letter dated 19 August 2007 from President Yusuf to the Minister of Finance



[Translation provided by Monitoring Group]

Mogadishu, August 19 2007
JS-XM/051/08/2007

To: Minister of Finance
Mogadishu

CC: Office of the Prime Minister
Mogadishu

Subject: Payment of Expenses for Collected Weapons

Dear Minister,

As you know the Government is currently occupied with how to take possession of the heavy weapons that the enemy has hidden in Mogadishu's environs.

Officers of the Presidential guard have managed to lay their hands on:

1. ZU 23 mounted on a 'Bagaase' [large Russian military truck]
2. ZU 23 mounted on a Mitsubishi [truck]
3. Dhashiike mounted on a pick-up
4. B10 mounted on a pick-up
5. And 106mm mounted on a pick up

I advise you to return to those Officers the expenses incurred in collecting those weapons, which total US\$ 5,000 (Five thousand dollars).

Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed
President of the Somali Republic

Annex IX**Overview of prices of weapons and ammunition at the Somali Arms Markets**

(In United States dollars)

Weapon	Before ICU	During ICU	After ICU	May 2007	Oct 2007	Dec 2007	Jan 2008	Feb 2008
Zu-23	70,000	10,000	5,000	25,000	N/A	27,000	N/A	N/A
DShK	14,000	5,000	3,000	8,000	N/A	9,300	7,500	7,000
B-10	7,000	2,000	1,500	6,000	N/A	7,600	4,000	4,000
PKM	12,000	6,000	4,000	2,000	4,200	4,000	6,000	3,500
AK-47	400	250	200	200	420	350	480	250
RPG-2	500	300	150	1,500	300	1,000	350	300
Pistol Tokarev				200	400	400	420	270
Hand grenade (F1)				8	80	80	80	65
Mines				50	300	N/A	380	250

Ammunition									
Piece									
Zu-23	7	3	0.50	3.20	N/A	3-4	N/A	N/A	
DShK	3.5	1	0.50	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.0	1.50	
B-10	120	30	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	60	
PKM	5	0.50	0.50	1	1	1.50	1.70	N/A	
AK-47	0.75	0.50	0.35	0.30	1.5	0.80	1.50	1.25	
RPG-2	150	100	25	120	300	220	130	90	

N/A = Not available.

Annex X

Transitional Federal Government accounting for donations from Saudi Arabia

Jamhuuriyadda Soomaaliya
Xukuumadda Federaalka KMG ah



جمهورية الصومال
الحكومة الاتحادية الفيدرالية
مكتب رئيس الوزراء

Xafiiska Ra'iisul Wasaaraha

The Transitional Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia
Office of the Prime Minister

(Translation from Somali language to English)

Ref: ODPM/WHTS/046B/07

Date: 08/09/2007

To: **Minister, Ministry of Finance**
Cc: **The Prime Minister of the TFG**
Cc: **The President of the Somali Republic**

Subject: **For your records**

Mr. Minister,

I herewith submit to you the expenditures of the grant we have received from the brotherly country of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The summary of the expenditures is as follows:

<u>Somali National Army</u>	US\$ 3,453,500.00
<u>National Police Force</u>	US\$ 1,424,943.00
<u>National Intelligence Agency</u>	US\$ 1,359,000.00
<u>Office of the President</u>	US\$ 1,665,345.00
Breakdown as follows:	
Mohamed Abdirizak (Travel to Nairobi)	\$ 95,000.00
Internet bills	4,110.00
Lower Jubba Elders	20,000.00
Reconstruction (Villa Somalia)	292,000.00
Purchase of Generators	176,000.00
Airline tickets	4,935.00
Abdullahi Dheere	20,000.00
Travel to Puntland	220,000.00
Abdulwahid	5,300.00
Awil	27,000.00
Hassan (Nairobi)	10,000.00
Presidency – Mogadishu	28,000.00
Presidency – Baidoa	20,000.00
Purchase of vehicle	30,000.00
Awil	3,000.00
Airline rent	57,000.00
Abdirashid Irro MP - (Reconciliation)	330,000.00
Airline rent	57,000.00
Reconstruction & repairs of a water well	181,000.00

Tel: +2521-5593134, Fax: +2521-643323, Mogadishu - Somalia
P.O. Box 623 – 00606 Sarit Centre, NBI – Kenya, Tel: +254-20-273 6618, Fax: +254-20-273 6619

Email: premiersom@wananchi.com

<u>Office of the Prime Minister</u>	US\$ 487,721.00
Breakdown as follows:	
Travel	10,000.00
Medical bills (Nairobi)	110,000.00
Fuel	6,000.00
Travel	5,000.00
Operational expenses	5,000.00
“ “ “ “	5,275.00
“ “ “ “	100,000.00
“ “ “ “	30,000.00
Siad – Baidoa	45,000.00
Abdullahi Mukhtar – Baidoa	20,000.00
Siad – Baidoa	5,000.00
Siad – Baidoa	3,000.00
Siad – rent of vehicles	56,000.00
Telecom bills	24,946.00
Telecom bills	27,000.00
Seeraar	2,000.00
Generator	33,000.00
<u>Parliament</u>	US\$ 1,275,000.00
<u>External expenses (Hospital bills \$ Airline rent)</u>	US\$ 483,100.00
Breakdown:	
Nairobi Embassy (Hospital bills)	96,400.00
Nairobi Embassy	16,500.00
Nairobi Embassy (Hospital bills & Airline rent)	209,150.00
Laito NBI (Hospital bills & Airline rent)	110,000.00
Airline rent	37,700.00
Nairobi Embassy	3,500.00
Nairobi (Airline rent)	9,850.00
<u>Debts paid</u>	US\$ 1,752,485.00
Breakdown:	
Qaran Express	378,000.00
Security/defense logistics	230,000.00
Jama Blue (Airliner)	220,000.00
Siad	3,500.00
Maryan Gabey	128,000.00
Asha Unlaye	100,000.00
Gurow MP	150,000.00
Iman M. Ali	500,000.00
Adde Gabow	20,000.00
Ossoble	12,985.00
Ayaan	30,000.00

Tel: +2521-5593134, Fax: +2521-643323, Mogadishu - Somalia
P.O. Box 623 – 00606 Sarit Centre, NBI – Kenya, Tel: +254-20-273 6618, Fax: +254-20-273 6619
Email: premiersom@wananchi.com

General expenses	US\$ 6,950,431.00
Breakdown:	
Rent for a tag to rescue for a Somali vessel sunk	150,000.00
Incentives for the elders who rescued the above vessel	100,000.00
Allowances for the security-men of the vessel (2 Months)	50,000.00
Transport for Puntland delegates to Mogadishu (NRC)	190,000.00
Hassan Qalaad –Deputy Mayor (Medical bills – Nairobi)	40,000.00
Purchase of Trucks/Lorries for the security forces	1,528,000.00
Incentives for Puntland delegates	30,000.00
Rehabilitation of Mogadishu Port Warehouses	681,208.00
Expenses for productive sector reform activity	48,000.00
Lunch ceremony for the Traditional Leaders (NRC)	6,500.00
Government operational costs	276,723.00
Puntland	3,000,000.00
Banadir Region (Mogadishu)	500,000.00
Food – Baidoa Prison	52,000.00
Central Bank of Somalia	298,000.00

Reconciliation	US\$ 8,135,000.00
Breakdown:	
Abdirashid Irro (MP)	45,000.00
Ahmed Bowbowle	10,000.00
Ali Mahdi	8,000,000.00
Tarrah – Minister (Ministry of Post & Telecommunication)	10,000.00
Sharmaarke Gaanni (MP)	20,000.00
Lower Shabelle Region	35,000.00
Aden Mohamed Ali (MP)	15,000.00

GRAND TOTAL **US\$ 26,987,125.00**

The details of these expenses will be provided later on since we are busy in the preparation of the related supporting documents God willing.

The Competent Departments of the Ministry of Finance will provide and submit to you what concerns about the internal revenues generated.

Regards,

(Signed)

Salim Alio Ibrow

The Minister, Ministry of Culture & High Education/ Deputy Prime Minister

*certified by the
PM - Geddi
11/09/07 -*

Tel: +2521-5593134, Fax: +2521-643323, Mogadishu - Somalia
P.O. Box 623 – 00606 Sarit Centre, NBI – Kenya, Tel: +254-20-273 6618, Fax: +254-20-273 6619
Email: premiersom@wananchi.com

3

Annex XI

Countries visited and representatives of Governments, organizations and private entities interviewed

France

Government officials

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence

Ethiopia

Somali Consulate in Addis Ababa

Kenya

Others

Institute of Security Studies

State representatives

Ambassador of The Netherlands
Ambassador of France
Embassy of Denmark
Ambassador of Saudi Arabia

International organizations

Special Representative of the Secretary-General A. Ould Abdallah (UNPOS)
United Nations Development Programme-Somalia
World Food Programme-Somalia
United Nations Department of Safety and Security Somalia
International Civil Aviation Organization
Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization-Interpol
European Union

Somalia

Government officials

President Abduhalli Yusuf Ahmed
Ali Mohamed Gedi, former Prime Minister
Hussein Ali Mohamud, Director, Office of the President
Abdi Hasan Awale Qeybdiid, Police Commissioner
Brigadier General Bashir Mohamed Jama, Deputy Police Commissioner
Daniel Bourzat, Consultant to the Somali Government
Abdillahi M. Duale, Somaliland Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mohamed Nur Osman, Director General, Somaliland Intelligence and Immigration
Abdillahi Ali Ibrahim, Somaliland Minister of Defence
Central Bank of Somalia

Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
Ambassador of Somalia to Indonesia

Uganda

Government officials

Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
External Security Organization
Special Envoy for Somalia

Yemen

Government officials

Political Security

United States of America

State Representatives
Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations
Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations
Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations
Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations
Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the
United Nations
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations
